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I INTRODUCTION
Predicting the course of international relations of
any country or bloc of countries is always a perilous enter-
prise. But few in 1956 would have predicted that within seven
years (6 September 1963) the editorial boards of Remain Ribao
(PEOPLE'S DAILY) and Hongq
i
(RED FLAG) would publish an ar-
ticle on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) say-
ing, among other things, "The facts of the past seven years
have amply proved that the road taken by the leadership of
the CPSU is the course of allying with imperialism against
socialism, allying with the United States against China,
allying with the reactionaries of all countries against the
people of the world." 1 Furthermore, this statement was not
made at a closed meeting, but publicly and with impunity.
This was barely the beginning of the surprising open dispute
that would increase in acrimony and scope. The dispute would
include liquidations of those suspected of sympathizing with
the other country's aims, and even armed border clashes.
Now, over ten years later, both countries retain troop masses
on their mutual border, and the hardening of the split seems
a fact of international life.
There were a few American and Western observers who did
think a split was possible and even inevitable. Edgar Snow,
in a Saturday Evening Post article written six months before
the revolutionary armies of Mao defeated Chiang Kai-chek's
1As quoted in Keesing's Research Report, The Sino-Soviet
Dispute (New York, 1969) p. 59.

forces, said that "Soviet Russia would not hold effective
domination over the extremely nation-conscious Chinese."^
For, he added "the Chinese look on their country as the po-
tential focus of a new federation of Eastern socialist states. "3
Dean Acheson also felt that a rift between Mao and Stalin was
inevitable, and argued for the United States 's withholding
recognition until such should occur. These views were in a
distinct minority, however. To most writers, the alliance
between Moscow and Peking seemed to be as monolithic as it was
claimed to be.
The recent overtures of the United States toward the
Chinese Peopled Republic provide dramatic evidence of the
appreciation of how fundamental the split has become. Perhaps
the United States could choose to officially ignore Communist
China while she was perceived to be either under Moscow's
dominion or at least acting in conjunction with Soviet poli-
cies. When it became clear that the dispute was no temporary
rift, but a deep-seated cleavage in the much-touted unity of
international Communism, the United States had the opportun-
ity and occasion to seek establishment of direct and official
contact. Previously, the United States had been constrained
to deal with China through the embassy in Warsaw. Albania,
North Korea, and Cuba may be officially ignored, but a nuclear
*- MWill China Become a Russian Satellite?," Saturday Even-
ing Post , Vol.221 No. 41 (9 April 1949), p. 30.
^Snow, p. 149.
^Present at the Creation (New York, 1970), p. 428.

power may not be
.
The implications of the nuclear power each possesses
make the rivalry between the Soviet Union and China one of
the gravest international rivalries ever experienced in the
modern world. The very question of nuclear armaments itself
is one of the major factors in the split. Many other factors
in the split also carry connotations of momentousness and
magnitude. The longest mutual border in the world lies be-
tween the two countries. The written record of border disputes
between Russian and Chinese goes back three centuries to 1649,
and each country still maintains a large army on this juncture
of fraternal socialist states. The history of Chinese-Russian
enmity itself goes back several more centuries before the bor-
der disputes. The most feared invaders of Russia have come
from the East. There is, in the Russian mind (and most influ-
ential Soviets are Russian), an association of the Chinese
with the Tartar occupation, and China holds that millions of
square miles of Soviet territory are properly Chinese.
If geographical, historical, and ethnic differences did
not contribute enough potential points of contention between
the two nations, there were a number of political and national
points of possible contention to supply the grounds for con-
flict. One of these factors was the very different ways in
which the two governments had come to power. The Soviets
took over a revolution already begun. The Party was the effec-
tive agent, whereas the army was always under suspicion. Un-
fortunately for it too, its first leader was Trotsky. The
Chinese, on the other hand, won their revolution through an

army which became the party. Noteworthy also is the fact that
the guidance and advice the Chinese received in their revolu-
tion from the Comintern (i.e. Moscow) was almost always wrong,
if not outright destructive.
Personalities of leaders, more of a factor in totalitar-
ian states than elsewhere, also provided a point of conflict.
Khrushchev* s flamboyant personal approach to politics was in
contrast to the style set by Stalin which had become, up to
1945 at least, the only model for Communist leaders. Khrush-
chev's attack on Stalin and the cult of personality could
not have endeared him to Chairman Mao under the best of cir-
cumstances, and at worst could be construed as an attack on
Mao, which later it was.
Most importantly, a precedent for a split in the ranks
of international Communism had been established by Yugoslavia.
Milan Bartos, the Yugoslav delegate to the United Nations,
wrote presciently in 1950, "the dispute between the USSR and
Jugoslavia is only a manisfestation of a much broader problem,
that is, the problem of relations between the Soviet Union
and all other countries which since the war have embarked on
a course of radical social transformation (China now belongs
to this group). /The dispute introduces^ an entirely new
element into the substance and picture of international rela-
tions." 5
On the other hand, there were also important and obvious
5" Jugoslavia's Struggle for Equality," Foreign Affairs
,
Vol.28 No. 3 (April 1950), p. 429.

factors working to keep the countries together. Both shared
an ideology, both were ant i-( Western) imperialist , and China
was economically dependent on the Soviet Union for her indus-
trialization, or so it seemed. If any of these factors, the
glue of relationship, were to change, it should follow then
that the relationship would also change under the pressure of
the antithetical forces listed above.
It is the thesis of this paper that the reason the split
did occur has fundamentally to do with how the Soviet Union,
and principally Nikita Khrushchev, responded in its foreign
and domestic policies to what it perceived to be two chal-
lenges posed by the United States in the 1950* s and 60's,
The first challenge posed by the United States was in the field
of international relations. The simple fact was that Soviet
attempts to expand communist influence had to take into account
American nuclear arms (then superior) and the possibility of
their use to resist obvious and overt Soviet expansion. The
second American challenge was inherent in the obvious material
superiority to Soviet society of a supposedly decadent capi-
talist society.
Khrushchev developed foreign and domestic policies to
meet these challenges. The policies proved to be mutually
supporting: peaceful coexistence in order to reduce the threat
of nuclear war (but not wars of national liberation) , and in-
creased emphasis on consumer goods and agricultural production.
Unfortunately, these policies also proved to be extremely hard
to reconcile to some of the classic Marxist-Leninist prescrip-

tions for class warfare and world revolution. Perhaps the
Soviet leaders thought this task could be achieved without
too much difficulty, for as Vladimir Weidle has observed, the
language of ideology in the Soviet Union has proved more dur-
able than the ideology itself. ^ But, in the end, the intel-
lectual acrobatics required to advance peaceful coexistence
and nationally-oriented domestic production as a primary goal
for a socialist state proved too much for the more-revolution-
ary-than-thou Chinese. Peking rightly saw policies it regard-
ed as ideologically unsound indicative of a change in Soviet
attitudes toward supporting Chinese interests.
Peter Van Ness, in a study of Chinese foreign policy, ar-
gues "The principal issue dividing the two powers through the
early 1960's was Russia's conciliatory attitude toward China's
great enemy, the United States, and Soviet willingness often
to cooperate with the United States in efforts to maintain the
status quo against China's radical assaults on it."' In the
summer of 19&3. when the Moscow-Peking debate came out into
the open, the Chinese said much the same thing themselves.
In July the CPU government charged that "the policy of the
Soviet Union is one of... allying with the United States to
o
oppose China." In August the charges were made more specific,
^Russia; Absent and Present (New York, I96I) p. 118.
'Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy (Berkeley, 1971) p. 64.
o
"Statement of the Chinese Government Advocating the Complete,
Thorough, Total and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear
Weapons and Proposing a Conference of the Government Heads of All
Countries of the World" (7/31/63) in Peter Berton, The Chinese-
Russian Dialogue: March-August 1963 (Berkeley , 1963) Vol. I, p. 7/31,1.

"The real aim of the Soviet leaders is to compromise with the
United States in order to seek monetary ease and to maintain
a monopoly of nuclear weapons and to lord it over the social-
ist camp. 15 ' (my emphasis).
How to contend with the nuclear-backed military power of
the American and American-supported armed forces in promoting
world communism, how to overcome the continuing material su-
periority of the American economy, in short, how to deal with
the United States formed a major part of the cause of the
Sino-Soviet split. A collateral issue concerned the nature
of leadership in the communist world and had been touched off
by the de-Stalinization campaign in the Soviet Union. This
second ma .lor issue in the dispute, though, is really related
to the first. While the reasons for the de-Stalinization cam-
paign may never be fully known, one of the most plausible ones
advanced is that the Soviet Union had reached something of an
impasse in its objectives of winning countries away from Wes-
tern influence. To seek new methods of operation, to depart
from Stalin's ways, it was inevitably necessary to repudiate
Stalin. The results of the policy to accomplish this of course
went far beyond the leadership's expectations.
The Chinese may be charged with overreacting to Soviet
tactical shifts in policies which did not portend fundamental
re-orientations of outlook, or it may be argued that the Chi-
nese were unduly paranoiac about their relations with all occi-
dental powers, but a reading of Soviet policy statements of
9 M Comment of Chinese Government on Soviet Statement of
August 3," (8/15/63) in Berton Vol.1, p. 8/15, 9.

8the period 195& to 196^ - from the XXth Congress of the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) until Khrushchev's re-
moval - tends to bear out Chinese accusations more often than
not. In all this, the United States was not considered by
the Chinese (until later and mostly for rhetorical purposes)
to be actively promoting the split. Rather, the role of the
United States was that of a catalyst - causing but not actu-
ally taking part in the interaction that led to the split.
An examination of the statements of Soviet leaders from
1956 to I963, and particularly those of Nikita Khrushchev,
will show how frequently and deeply considerations of the
United States figured in Soviet policies, whether foreign or
domestic. Initially, there was no adverse response from the
Chinese, but as Soviet attention focused on its great capi-
talist rivals, Chinese actions and their statements revealed
their fears of being excluded from the Soviets' concerns.
The plan of this paper is to show those Soviet policies and
statements concerning the United States which proved to be so
upsetting to the Chinese, and then to show how the Chinese re-
acted to them.
There were two basic aspects of Soviet views about the
United States. First, Soviet writings regularly depicted the
United States as the most advanced capitalist country and
therefore, rare disclaimers notwithstanding, the yardstick
against which the most advanced socialist country must measure
its economic progress. The United States was also the rival
to beat in an international economic competition. Public
statements of such domestic and international competition re-

vealed a basis other than that of ideology for the determina-
tion of Soviet domestic and economic policy, In trying to over-
take the United States economically, the Soviet Union produced
a "goulash communism" of material prosperity which could have
little relation to the goals of programs of a Chinese People's
Republic still struggling toward industrialization and trying
to feed an enormous population.
The second aspect of the Soviet view of the United States
was that of a coegual nuclear superpower. This overwhelming
armament advantage put the two countries in an exclusive club
with a membership of just two. The history of Russia in inter-
national politics has special relevance here. Most historians,
Russian and Western, would agree that Czarist Russia's ruling
circles had a general sense of being inferior to the Western
European countries. Although differences between Russia and
the West may have been deliberately accentuated by Russian
leaders in some areas, e.g. language and religion, it is equal-
ly significant that Peter the Great built his capital, St.
Petersburg, on his empire's Western boundary and the nobility
of Russia preferred to speak French. Czarist Russia's history
of dealings in the various alliances and congresses does not
show a record of astuteness and success, nor even self-confi-
dence.
Even after the October revolution the Soviet Union was
relegated to an inferior status, apart from its material weak-
ness, by the simple fact of the initial non-recognition of its
government. When it did establish diplomatic relation with
other nations its ambassadors were, in the spirit of the new
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classless society, given only the title of polpred (
p
olno -
mochniy predstavitel '» authorized spokesman) -^ by the Soviet
Union, and thus assured of protocol ranking below every other
country's diplomats. The emergence of the Soviet Union after
World War II as the unquestioned leading landpower of the
Eurasian "world- island" and shortly after as a nuclear power
too, put it in a position of preeminence which it had been
denied for more than three centuries.
If the people of the United States had been reluctant
to assume a world .leadership role, Soviet leaders saw vindi-
cation of the revolution and all of Russia's subsequent tur-
moil in their new station in the community of nations.
Alexis deTocqueville' s prediction of the United States and
Russia ruling the destinies of the globe seemed to have come
true. 11 That this Soviet outlook also had foundations in
traditional Russian great-power chauvinism as well as propa-
gation of the world proletarian revolution would come to be
appreciated in Peking more than anywhere else.
Having achieved a position of parity with the United
States as the only power that seemed to matter, the Soviet
Union was determined to maintain that position as a minimum
goal. The ultimate goal was to surpass the United States as
a world power and gain unquestioned ascendancy in the commun-
ity of nations. The Soviet foreign policies developed in sup-
port of these goals involved several immediate objectives.
1xvThe transliteration system used throughout is the modified
Library of Congress system. In documentation, however, transliter-
ations of the source are used.
Democracy in America , Vol.1 (New Rochelle, I965) pp. 430-31.
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One was neutralizing the West's strategic position advantages
manifested in the many overseas US bases, the so-called "cap-
italist encirclement." A second was the encouragement of a
reduction of US military forces and preparedness. Permitting
the Korean War was one of the greatest foreign policy blunders
of the Soviet Union. The strengthening of Western anti-Commu-
nist resolve it produced was part of the damage which had to
be undone. NATO and its counterparts elsewhere now forced
the Soviets into expensive reactive moves. The reaction to
Stalin was in part due to his failure to deal successfully
with the United States,
A third objective of Soviet policy also began now to
take shape, limiting spread of nuclear weapons. The interna-
tional picture could be complicated, and the position of lea-
dership of either country challenged by the appearance of an-
other large country with nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
Both countries appreciated this. In the Unites States, Henry
Kissinger elaborated the complexities of multipying the number
of nuclear powers in what he called the "nth" country prob-
lem. The Soviets' official ideology, and hence their poli-
cy positions, were grounded in the dialectic of thesis-anti-
thesis. Soviet (Russian) obsession with chess as a paradigm
of power relations likewise conditioned them to look at the
world situation as a zero-sum game, i.e. two rivals, capita-
lism and communism, winner take all. A tri-partite world or-
der was difficult for them to talk about, let alone imagine.
•^Nucl e ar Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, 1957) passim.
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Both sides sought to avoid it.
A, Avtorkhanov, a graduate of the School of Red Profes-
sors in Moscow, identifies three factors determining Soviet
foreign policy. These are 1) the fundamental and unchanging
substantive factors (political, ideological , etc
.) , 2) the
transitory and derivative variable factors (peace, "coexis-
tence," self-determination, etc.), and 3) natural interests. 3
The first of these factors remained ostensibly unchanged
throughout the period. One has only to remember Khrushchev's
famous "We will bury you" statement to recall what ultimate
Soviet objectives were, What did change was the relative em-
phasis given to the second and third factors. "Peaceful co-
existence" occupied a prominent place in almost every foreign
policy statement. And Soviet "natural interests" were now
seen to be acutely involved in any US-USSR conflict where the
potential for nuclear warfare was involved. The Chinese did
not follow along with these shifts in Soviet foreign policy.
Foreign policy considerations influence, and are in turn
influenced, by considerations of domestic policy. If the
Soviet Union was to overtake the United States, it had a long
way to go. The Soviet economy had never really gotten started
during the trials and errors of the 1930' s. The shift to war
production all but eliminated any gains made by economic sta-
bility. The Western areas of the Soviet Union had been so
devastated by World WarH that the process of rebuilding las-
*3"pactors Determining Soviet Foreign Policy," Problems
of Soviet roreign Policy (Munich, 1959) p. !•
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ted into the mid-fifties. Now, some forty years after the
revolution, and after enduring the privations of forced in-
dustrialization, collectivization of agriculture, and the
losses of war, the people of the Soviet Union were coming to
expect more of the amenities of life. Certainly Khrushchev
thought so.
Two objectives of Soviet domestic policy complemented
each other: provide more consumer goods for the people, and
demonstrate to the world the superiority of a socialist econ-
omy in doing so. To a great extent, these objectives were
compatible with the foreign policy objectives of convincing
the United States to l) relinquish its overseas bases, and
2) reduce its military establishment. A single theme of
"peaceful coexistence" could provide the framework for the
accomplishment of all of them. This same theme could also
provide the rationale for Soviet arguments for limiting the
spread of nuclear weapons.
To incorporate these objectives of foreign and domestic
policy into a program that would also allow the Soviets to
pursue the traditional Marxist-Leninist goals of advancing
the world prolitarian revolution and building an international
classless world order was Nikita Khrushchev's task. The Sino-
Soviet split is evidence of how successful the Chinese lea-
dership thought he was.
When and where did the split begin? Although nothing
they said at the time would indicate it, the Chinese later
asserted that "the difference began with the 20th Congress of

m-
the CPSU.'* The Soviets too considered this Congress as "a
turning point in international relations" 1 -* and most analysts
would agree that this most dramatic of all Congresses, which
included the famous secret speech, marks the departure point.
Before turning to the beginning of the chronology of the di-
vision between Moscow and Peking, it is necessary to consider
the kinds of evidence that are available to the researcher
and to mention some of the ideological and political factors
that give the controversy its particular form.
1
"The Origin and the Development of the Differences Be-
tween the Leadership of the CFSU and Ourselves," (9/6/63), in
Berton Vol.11, p. 9/6, 2.
5/Editorial7 International Affairs , January 1956, p. 5.
Hereafter cited as IA. This Soviet English language publication
is not to be confused with the similarly named publication of
the International Institute of Strategic Studies (London).
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II THE LANGUAGE AND THE BACKGROUND OP THE DEBATE
The study of any countrj'-'s diplomatic and foreign policy
documents requires recognition of the modes of diplomatic
thought, the customary blandness and circumlocutions of offi-
cial statements, and an understandable reluctance on the part
of the writers of such documents to deal in absolutes or fi-
nalities in expositions of immediate positions or policies.
The problems of Soviet studies are made another order of mag-
nitude more complex by the systematic employment of the special
rhetoric of Communist ideology and Marxian dialectic.
Sir William Hayter, for six years British ambassador in
Moscow, speaks the "habitual untruthfulness, this lying on
principle. "16 The principle is the dialectical notion that
a statement may be potentially true. That is, if according
to Marxian view of history or science something will likely
happen, it is perfectly permissible in an effort to convert
the masses for a Communist to say that it has happened. Sta-
lin's proclamation of the triumph of socialism in the Soviet
Union in 1936 is an example. The techniques and guidelines
of interpreting these esoteric communications, part of what
Robert Conquest calls the "black art of Kremlinology" are best
set forth in the chapter "Questions of Evidence" in his Power
and Policy in the USSR . 1?
Individual words or phrases themselves pose problems in
^
"Russia and the World; A Study in Poreign Policy (New
York, 1970) p. 14.
17New York, 1967 , Chapter 3.
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understanding Soviet statements. Many words have particular
meanings with respect to ideology. A major category involves
labeling of incorrect thinkers. Since there can be only one
true Marxist-Leninist faith, all else must be heresy or devia-
tion and has to be identified so the faithful may be warned
of error and heretics condemned. A multitude of such cate-
gorizations exist. Generally, those who follow a conservative
line are opportunists, reformists (i.e. those working within
the existing systems), capitulationists , etc. In such terms
do the Soviets nowstand accused by Peking. Those who insist
on immediate and revolutionary action are dogmatists, adven-
turists, sectarianlsts , etc. This is how the Soviets accuse
<Vl 1 «> ~ — <-Nill XJilO o ^ »
Every sphere of Communist activity has ideologically
loaded words. Promotion of "heavy industry" connotes a hard
line and militaristic outlook, whereas "light industry" con-
notes consumer goods production. "Medium machine building"
denotes nuclear energy and nuclear weapons.
There are also words and phrases favored by Soviet lea-
ders which carry particular impact because of their associa-
tions in the purely Russian literature and culture. Nathan
Leites has produced several works of his content analysis of
1 ft
elite articulations. For example, he shows that the image
of the grave or burial is reserved for opponents. The Germans
who invaded Russia are in their graves; the Russian defenders
have merely fallen.
l°The most fully developed presentation of Leites' s method-
ology is to be found in A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe , 111. , 1953).
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In addition to determining the sense of Soviet statements
there is a problem of the enormous profusion of them as well
as their length. Speeches are measured in Piours. The Soviet
passion for bigness, gigantonania, as it is called, is no more
evident than in speeches and reports. Repetition is certain-
ly one of the most favored rhetorical devices followed closely
by profuse illustration, examples, and resumes of past events.
Hayter probably summed up the whole problem of Soviet sources
best when he wrote:
The Soviet official language is hard, dry, inhuman,
mechanized, full of mis-named abstract concepts do-
ing duty for arguments. The same pompous phrases
occur again and again in every official speech,
making them impossible to listen to and almost im-
possible to read. Somewhere in all this dross there
is sometimes embedded a nugget of new thought, but
it is hard to excavate or even identify. Reading
between the lines is necessary, of course, but the
reader or listener is so battered by the hail of
cliches that he hardly retains enough alertness to
detect the one small sentence which is meant to hint,
cryptically, at a policy switch, or a movement for-
ward. 1 9
Like Polonius, one must "by indirection, find directions out."
A more familiar problem lies in translation of the language
itself. Words and phrases do not always translate exactly, and
l^Hayter, Russia and the World, loc. cit.
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the resulting ambiguities may be put to use for the purpose of
propaganda or deception, In the 1950* s, Soviet magazines would
print photographs of groups or gatherings in which persons were
deleted from the photograph or added from other photographs.
Since the Russian word for photo ( foto ) is both singular and
plural, the Soviets may have been literally accurate while de-
ceiving. The word zagovorlt ' has two meanings: to start to
talk (about something) or to chatter incessantly (about some-
thing). Translation in the first sense when the second is
intended may give, a neutral coloration to a statement that is
hostile, and vise versa.
The assessment of the relative importance of the many
Soviet statements is also a problem. To an extent, the prob-
lem is ameliorated by the fact that all publications must pass
the state censorship, G lav
i
t . Therefore, virtually all that
is published can be said to have official sanction. Generally,
publications from writers or organizations, such as the Insti-
tute for International Relations or the Academy of Social
Science, under the auspices of the Central Committee of the
CPSU are of particular importance. Certain individuals have
special authority, e.g. Boris Ponomarev who is author of the
only one-volume history of the CPSU in Russia and who is a
member of the Central Committee of the Party. On a day-to-day
basis, Pravda is the most important newspaper since it is the
party's official organ, whereas Izvestiia is the organ of the
government
.
? oCurrent Soviet Policies , Vol.1, ed. Leo Gruilow (New
York, 1953) P. 53^
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There are even more precise clues to a statement's impor-
tance. Controversial subjects or articles announcing new
policy lines usually appear on the inner pages of the journal
rather than on the front page. Unsigned articles are more
authoritative than signed articles because the former imply
collegiality and are harder to repudiate than articles attri-
buted to a single source.
Moving up the hierarchy of sources, the pronouncements
and speeches of government leaders are obviously more impor-
tant in an authoritarian state than any interpretive material
which has a way of becoming rapidly dated. In the years un-
der consideration, 1956 to 1964, the speeches and writings
of Khrushchev himself are the most important sources. By US
standards, a large number of speeches are given so the par-
ticular audience may not be indicative of the importance of
a speech. Speechmaking is the usual way of disseminating
government policy. The foreign or domestic situation of the
particular moment rather than the audience or occassion will
often be seen to determine a speech's subject. Khrushchev's
speeches illustrate this very well. For an example, although
speaking to a reception at the Soviet-Indian Friendship Soci-
ety in Bombay, after a few amenities he said "Let us turn to
21the problem of German unification," Clearly this was the
main topic of his speech.
There is one speech regularly given which surpasses all
others in importance as an indication of Soviet policy, pro-
21 International Affairs, January 1956. p. 19^.
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grams, and goals. This is the otchetnii doklad
, the report
of the Central Committee to the Party Congress. It is "prob-
ably the single most authoritative official statement of So-
22
viet policy available to the non-Communist world." Given
at the beginning of each Congress by the party leader, or as
at the XlXth Party Congress in 1952 by the heir apparent,
Georgi Malenkov, it is the keynote address but a good deal
more. It is a combination of State of the Union address and
Papal Encyclical, Divided into three parts - the Soviet Union,
the international situation, and the Party - it reviews the
events since the last Congress concerning each area, ar^alyses
,
trends, and influences in each area. Each section is con-
cluded by an enumeration of tasks to be accomplished.
Two considerations must be borne in mind in studying
an otchetnii doklad . First, it is or ought to be formulated
according to Marxian dialectic and therefore defines correct
positions to be taken by all loyal communists and excludes
all varient or alternative positions. Second, as it is given
by the leadership, it is meant as a directive rather than a
persuasion or suggestion. Almost always the rest of the Con-
gress is spent on deciding the consequences and implementation
of the otchetnii doklad
. Analysis of the relative amount of
attention given to each item and comparison with previous dok-
lads is essential for the detection of shifts and new direc-
tions in Soviet policy.
22see the unpubl. diss. (Fletcher, 1959) by Brewster C.
Denny, "The Soviet Evaluation of the Instruments and Intentions
of Post-War American Foreign Policy, 1952-1956," p. 29.
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In the examination of Soviet materials of the Khrushchev
era, finally, there are two anomalies which show the extent
to which Khrushchev's personal idiosyncracies marked his re-
gime. One is the famous Secret Speech at the XXth Party Con-
gress which denounced Stalin and the kult llchnostl (cult of
personality). The other is Khrushchev Remembers ,
2
^ an unauth-
orized but authentic record of Khrushchev's reminiscences
about his career and first secretaryship. The singularity of
these documents lies in an emphsis on personalities which is
wholly alien to the Marxian idea that the forces of history,
not individuals, are that which shape events. Never before,
nor likely ever again, has a ruling communist party explicitly
repudiated one of its leaders, or has a leader provided a per-
sonalized account of his time in office. This is not to say
these documents are more important than the otchetnii doklads,
but they do deserve special attention.
The problems of evaluating and interpreting Soviet source
material are forbidding, but the work is essential for that
understanding of the Soviet policy which must be incorporated
in American policy formulations. In The_RiyaIs : America and
Russia Since World War II , Adam Ularn points out that "at no
other time /the late fifties7 did the Soviets make it so dif-
ficult for an outsider to perceive or even guess what they
were after. n2^ Re argues, however, that while much of the
cold war confrontations were the results of misperceptions of
2 3 ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston, 1970).
2^+The Rivals (New York, 1971 ) P- 284-.
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the adversary's policies, "There was one unpardonable derelic-
tion and that was not to know." 2 5 (emphasis in original)
The use of Chinese sources in this paper has the more
limited purpose of illustrating the subject and the acrimony
of the charges made against the leadership of the CPSU by Fe-
king. The same cautions appropriate to Soviet materials apply
In attempting to discern the real meaning of official Chinese
statements. Two factors make the handling of Chinese source
materials somewhat easier. There are simply fewer of them,
and Peking made a greater effort than Moscow during the per-
iod to get its viewpoints widely disseminated in translation.
It is not the point to show that Peking's charges were actu-
ally true, there is an obvious distortion of relations be-
tween Moscow and Washington, but rather these charges revealed
what the Chinese feared and why they felt they must find their
own way.
The Sino-Soviet split occured in the particular context
of international relations of the nineteen fifties and early
sixties. The United States figured prominently in the rhetoric
and debate surrounding it and was a major factor in causing
the split. There are also a number of factors having to do
with territorial claims and with relations between the CPSU
and the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) which figure in the
dispute and will be briefly outlined here.
Governmental contacts between China and Russia go back
to the middle of the seventeenth century, and one of the first
2 5lbid., p. 101.
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state transactions was the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689. By
this treaty the Czar recognized Chinese suzerainty over Mon-
golia and gave up claims to territory north of the Amur River.
Over the next two centuries Russia's strength relative to China
grew enormously and, in I858, the Czar's expansionism saw the
retaking of the territory north of the Amur. By i860 Vladi-
vostock (which translates, significantly, as "ruler of the
East") and the territory east of the Ussuri River was Russian.
In I896 the Russians built the Chinese Eastern Railway across
Manchuria to Vladivostock, established bases at Port Arthur
and Dairen, and so took control of the Liaotung penninsula.
In 1921 the independent Mongolian People's Republic was pro-
claimed, although in a treaty in 1924 the embryonic Soviet
Union did concede to the Kuomintang government that Mongolia
was an integral part of China.
The Japanese, who had already taken Port Arther in 1904,
made further encroachments into the area with the takeover
of Manchuria in 1931 and forced the Soviets to sell the Chi-
nese Eastern Railway in 1935- The Soviets, in spite of the
1924 treaty, concluded a defensive alliance with Mongolia in
1936 and had troops stationed on the Chinese-Mongolian border
by 1938. Meanwhile, armed clashes had occured between the
Soviet and Japanese troops on the Manchurian border. Almost
unnoticed was a small Soviet garrison in Sinkiang supporting
the then pro-Soviet warlord General Sheng Shih-ts'ai. The
General's increasing demands and exigencies of the military
situation on the Russian western front in 19^3 forced the
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garrison* s withdrawal. These Soviet troops had supported the
man who had Mao Tse-tung's brother executed.
The conference at Yalta made concessions to the Soviets 1
claims on China. Stalin in return recognized Chiang Kai-shek
as the ruler of China. A treaty extracted from their erst-
while Chinese ally of eleven days in 19^5 gave the Soviets a
guarantee of Mongolian independence, joint management of the
Chinese Eastern Railway for thirty years, and a thirty year
lease for a naval base at Port Arthur with the Soviets respon-
sible for its defense (i.e. allowing the presence of ground
troops and aircraft as well as ships).
In the ensuing civil war between Chiang and Mao, the
Soviet Union was remarkably slow to recognize the government
of a fraternal communist party. It was not until 1 October
19^9 that Stalin withdrew recognition from the Nationalist
government and extended it to Mao. One of the first mutual
actions undertaken by the two governments was the renegotia-
tion of the August 19^5 Treaty. The final agreements, which
were reached only after two months negotiation, provided for
a mutual defense pact, the Soviet cession of the Chinese Eas-
tern Railway, Dalny , Port Arthur, and the granting of credits
to the Chinese by the USSR.^D As a sign of the mutual confi-
dence in each others economies, the amount of credits to be
given had to be specified in US dollars.
The Korean War introduced a new and portentous element
into the Sino-Soviet relations. Regardless of whether Moscow
or Peking had encouraged Kim II- sung, it was the Chinese who
2bThe Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, ed. Alvin Z.
Rubinstein, 3rd ed. (New York, 1972) p. 241.
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pulled Moscow's chestnuts out of the fire. The Soviets were
undoubtedly surprised by the degree of US commitment where
none had evidently been expected, and thus did not have any
immediate fallback plans in case of reverses. Incredibly,
when the Soviets supplied the equally unprepared Chinese with
arms, they sold the weapons to their allies. If the Korean
War suggested a new relation between China and the USSR, the
death of Stalin made it virtually certain. But a new rela-
tionship would still have to be expressed in terms of the
familiar, shared ideology which had no precedents or prescrip-
tions for international relations between Communist states.
It would be impossible to attempt a survey of even the
Vit chl i chf 1 fif* fc^- ^ orr™ or\A iHonln^-ir nf en p.nTTi-nT'ohpn h i tt<» «
system as Marxism-Leninism purports to be. Some features
of the ideology have particular relevance to the Sino-Soviet
dispute as it concerned the problem of dealing with the United
States, and these will be outlined here.
One of the most fundamental Marxist-Leninist tenets of
state relations was the historically determined, inevitable,
and implacable antagonism between capitalism and socialism.
Furthermore, the final confrontation was almost always spo-
ken of as being violent. Lenin's earlier writings, particu-
larly Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism , dwell on
this. In speaking of the conflict growing between bourgeois
and proletarian interests at the beginning of the century he
asked , "When the relation of forces is changed, how else, under capi-
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talism , can the solution of contradictions be found, except
by resorting to violence?" 2 ? (emphasis in original) Later,
writing on the eve of the Russian revolution in August 191? *
he asserted that, "The replacement of the bourgeois by the
proletarian state is impossible without a violent revolution." 2 "
After the Russian revolution and the loss of several parts of
the Czarist empire, Lenin modified his policies to allow for
the Soviet's weakness. In this circumstance, extreme Soviet
weakness, "peaceful coexistence" was permitted with capitalist
neighbors. This formulation was the occasion for the split
with Trotsky. Lenin died before the full implications of his
thinking on the matter could be explored.
Josef Stalin assumed, among other things the mantle of
leading theoretician for the party. One result of Stalin's
work in this area was the publication in 1925 of a systematized
exposition of the five contradictions inherent in capitalism
that had been identified by Lenin in the course of his writings.
These contradictions exist between the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie, the imperialist countries and their colonies,
imperialists on the winning side of World War II (or any such
war), and imperialists on the losing side, imperialist winners
versus each other, and the USSR (i.e. socialist countries) and
the capitalist world. 9
27Lenin, Imperialism; the highest Stage of Capitalism (New
York, 1939) p. 9o~:
p o
^Lenin, State and Revolution (New York, 1971) p. 20.
29Stalin, Collected Works
, Vol.7 (Moscow, 1925) pp. 269-295.
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Contradictions are not merely philosophical abstractions
to the Marxist ideologue. They are the stuff of history and
all as potentially violent as any revolution can be. Twen-
ty-seven years after writing about contradictions, Stalin had
had a chance to test and revise his opinions on this facet of
ideology and its implication to international relations. There
are signs he may have been changing his attitudes, however
slightly, to allow for a less belligerent approach to the con-
tradictions between capitalism and socialism. Writing in his
last tract, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, he
argued that contradictions between capitalist countries them-
selves had grown stronger than the contradictions between the
capitalist camp and the socialist camp.^ u
Stalin also used the phrase "peaceful coexistence,"
though always enclosed in quotation marks or set off in the
text, rather frequently. It can be further argued that a
softening of approach toward relations with Iran in 1952 and
the Soviet proposal of a re-unified, re-armed but neutral
Germany in that same year showed a change in the direction of
Soviet policy. On the other hand, Stalin had also discussed
rather candidly what he thought of the ultimate chances for
peace and "peaceful coexistence."
"What is most likely is that the present-day peace
movement, as a movement for the preservation of
peace, will, if it succeeds, result in preventing
a particular war, in its temporary preservation of
3°Stalin, Ec onomic Problems of Socialism in the USSR (Mos-
cow, 1952) p. "50.
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a particular peace, in the resignation of a bel-
licose government and its supersession by another
that is prepared temporarily to keep the peace.
That, of course, will be good. Even very good.
But, all the same, it will not be enough to elim-
inate the inevitability of wars between capitalist
countries generally. It will not be enough, be-
cause, for all the success of the peace movement,
imperialism will remain, continue in force - and
consequently the inevitability of wars will also
continue in force.
To eliminate the inevitability of war it is
necessary to abolish imperialism. "31 (emphasis in
original)
That statement and Soviet activities in relation to the Kor-
ean War argue against any amelioration of Stalin's views on
war. If he had been in the process of changing his mind,
like Lenin, he died before a new direction could be estab-
lished. Certainly his successors felt that new ways must
be sought to deal with the United States, and this meant
explicit or implicit repudiation of Stalin's methods.
It should be evident that the ideological positions on
the inevitability of strife between capitalism and communism
thus far presented have been complicated by having to deal
with the idea, in some form, of peaceful coexistence. It
should be no surprise that in a belief system which holds the





unity of opposites as one of its tenets. This idea which
seems antithetical to the notion of an inevitably violent
world conflict is also a product of Lenin's. The ensuing
split with Trotsky along with the failure of social revolu-
tion in Germany led Lenin to write the tract on which the
Soviets were to rely so heavily for ideological rectitude in
their dispute with the Chinese.
"Left-VJing" Communism, An Infantile Disorder is a tacti-
cal manual born of experience in dealing with the capitalist
bourgeois enemy and lays open the way for the greatest flex-
ibility, especially in the conduct of foreign policy. Lenin
began by pointing out to the parties which had failed to win
revolutions in 1918-20 what was lacking. "The revolutionary
parties must complete their education. They have learned to
attack. Now they must realize that this knowledge must be
supplemented by the knowledge of how to retreat properly. "3^
To these parties he contrasted the experience of his own
Bolshevik party which had "ruthlessly exposed and expelled
the revolutionary phrase-mongers, who refused to understand
that one had to retreat, that one had to know to retreat. "33
He then proceeded to give specific guidance on how Communists
should act in various situations of power, or lack of it, in
which they might find themselves. On dealings with non-com-
munists he admonished, "to reject compromises in general, no
matter of what kind, is childishness ." 3^ in setting limits
3 2Lenin, "Left -Wins;" Communism; An Infantile Disorder (New
York, 19^0) p. 13.
33ibid, p. 14. 3^ibid, p. 22.
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to compromise he observed that "all dividing lines in nature
and society are mutable ."35 (emphasis in original)
Lenin of course never abandoned his ultimate goal or his
contempt for the enemy. His aim was to ensure that all tac-
tics were available to the communist revolutionary.
The more powerful enemy can be conquered only by
exerting the utmost effort, and by necessarily
,
thoroughly, carefully, attentively and skillfully
taking advantage of every, even the smallest, "rift"
among the enemies, of every antagonism of interest
among the bourgeoisie of the various countries...,
by taking advantage of every, even the smallest,
opportunity cf gaining a mass ally, even though this
ally be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable,
and conditional. Those who do not understand this
do not understand even a particle of Marxism. 3"
(emphasis in original)
Lenin concluded that assurance of final victory for fraternal
communist parties, hence the whole communist movement, lacked
only one ingredient. That was an understanding of the "neces-
sity of displaying the utmost flexibility in their tactics. "37
This flexibility of tactics suited the personal style of Khrush-
chev well, especially in his attitude toward and dealings with
the United States. It also was a major contribution to the
Sino-Soviet dispute.
Conditions conducive to the split have been found in many
35ibid, p. 51. 36 Ibid| p< 53# 37ibid, p. 82.
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other areas toos the rivalry for control of peoples in the
border regions who were neither Slavic nor Sinic, racial
antagonism, and the zeal of the recently victorious Chinese
contrasted to the bureaucrat ized Russian revolutionaries.
Soviet and Chinese literature clearly show, however, that
these considerations all entered the debates after it had
begun. In March of 19^3 "the Chinese enumerated a long list
of points of dispute in a letter to the CFSU but concluded
that the fundamental difference remained in the question of
how to conduct "the struggle against imperialism headed by
the United States."^ 8
At the time of Stalin's death and after, Soviet concern
for dealing with the United States focused on Europe, the
question of US bases, German rearmament, and the possibility
of nuclear war. Whether or not it was evident to Stalin, his
successors certainly recognized that an impasse in dealing
with the West had been reached, and even had there been some-
one capable of carrying them off, the foreign policy methods
of Stalin were no longer getting results. Once the question
of who would rule in the Kremlin was settled, that man would
have to decide how to deal with the United States. "Left -Wing"
Communism could provide a means to escape the rigidities of
Stalin's doctrinaire, not to say paranoiac, policies. There
was now a new if unrecognized parameter for Soviet policy ma-
king. Mao was now the elder statesman of International Commu-
nism and would have to be consulted on the directions major
3 8David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev (New York, 1964) p. 379.
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policies would take. As we shall see, this did not happen at
the XXth CPSU Congress.

33
III A TURNING POINT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
XXth PARTY CONGRESS
It is with a good deal of justification that the Soviet
writers have styled the XXth Party Congress of the CPSU as
a turning point in international relations, although it is
doubtful that any irony was intended. This Congress formal-
ized the "break with the past, but some signs of this break
with the Stalinist policies appeared as soon as the succession
struggle was settled in favor of Khrushchev and Bulganin in
early 1955* Kremlin-watchers began to note that occasions
for referring to Stalin's memory or leadership were being by-
passed without that accustomed mention. Military victories
of World War II were being spoken of without the obligatory
acknowledgement that it was Stalin's military genius which
had authored them. The first dramatic departure from the
style of the old regime, though, was the personal diplomacy
of Bulganin and Khrushchev.
The Geneva conference of 1955 marked the first time
since the Congress of Vienna that a Russian leader had attended
a' conference of heads of state not surrounded by his own
troops. As yet, this was only a new method in Soviet diplo-
macy. A new direction was signalled by the trip of Bulganin
and Khrushchev to India, Burma, and Pakistan in the late fall
of 1955. This evident shift of Soviet interest to the Indian
sub-continent was reminiscent of a Czarist foreign policy tac-
tic; frustration in one area led to a renewed effort in a dif-
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ferent area. In this case the scene of immediate operations
shifted from Europe to India, but many familiar policy themes
would be heard nonetheless.
On 21 November 1955 both Bulganin and Khrushchev addressed
the Indian parliament. Bulaganin, speaking first, apprised
the audience of the reason behind the trip, viz. to gain
•neutral' support (such an oxymoron would not bother a Marx-
ist) against the United States. Cooperation between India
and the Soviet Union had many purposes including the "effort
to promote peace and ease international tension."--'' With
particular reference to Europe, Bulganin stated that the
Soviet Union was "opposed to the policy of forming military
blocs and favored the liquidation of blocs already furmed."
A major portion of the speech was then devoted to the Soviet
Union's efforts at peace-making in Europe.^ 1 This was being
brought to the attention of the Indian parliament because, as
Bulganin somewhat patronizinly informed it, "There is a grand
process of awakening of the peoples of the East to political
life. "^2
Khrushchev's speech followed. After a panegyric to life
in the Soviet Union, it turned to the familiar excoriation of
the United States. "Certain elements in some countries are
39'»speeches of Bulganin and Khrushchev on Tour of India,
Burma, and Pakistan," International Affairs , January I956,
P* ^77, In consideration of the length of most Soviet state-
ments, frequent citations will be given to aid in location of
specific remarks.
^°Ibid, p. 179. 4l lbid, p. 180. 42 Ibid, p. I85.
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still trying to carry on the notorious "positions of strength"
policy /i.e. Dulles7, the policy of holding up the threat of
atomic waepons."^3 Three days later at a speech to the Indo-
Soviet Cultural Society in Bombay, Khrushchev was again at
work on familiar and quite European themes. He accused un-
named western powers of being responsible for hurling the
armed forces of Hitler Germany against the USSR. The con-
clusion of his speech was the usual sort of bellicosity in
Soviet speeches. "And so we say to the gentry who are ex-
pecting the Soviet Union to change its political program:
'Wait until the crab whistles! 1 ...We have never abandonoed,
and never will abandon our political line which was mapped
by Lenin." ^ There was added, however, the new element, "We
have to live on one planet. Living means coexisting." °
This reference to the common fate of mankind on a small
planet faced with the possible horrors of a nuclear war was
a new theme in Soviet policy statements. Even this early
some Soviet foreign service personnel in the field in South-
east Asia saw the possibility of conflict between China and
the Soviet Union over the differing perceptions of foreign
policy requirements. One, Alexander Kaznacheev, saw the
journey of Bulganin and Khrushchev as an attempt to gain sup-
port among neutral nations - and their local communist parties -
for the new Soviet foreign policy direction. He concluded
that an open conflict between Moscow and Peking was inevitable
because of their differing perceptions of how to deal with the




The Soviet leaders courted India by referring to it as
the other great Asian pov,rer besides China. Judging from the
rhetoric, the purpose of this reference was not to develop
a counterpoise to an imagined Chinese threat, but to enlist
an ally against the Western powers. Whatever the reason, the
equation with socialist India cannot have pleased communist
China, But the Soviets, although they were now seeking new
openings in the Wear East, Middle East, and India, were still
preoccupied with European problems. Throughout all the rhe-
toric and pronouncements of Moscow in the period leading up
to the XXth CPSU Congress, there run the dominant and familiar
themes of fear of West German re-armament, necessity for dis-
mantlement of NATO, and the threat of a nuclear war touched
off by a European confrontation. There was also, however,
a barely perceptible shift of emphasis toward the paramount
necessity for avoiding nuclear war.
The lead editorial in the first edition of International
Affairs for the new year, entitled simply "1956," gave more
specific indications of the course of Soviet policy to be for-
malized at the XXth Party Congress. Not only the Soviet Union,
but the Chinese People's Republic, "a Great Fower of a new
type," were "advancing along a new path of historical develop-
ment . " Here, as for a number of years to come, the assump-
tion was made that China as well as the East European satel-
^' Alexander Kaznacheev, Inside a Soviet Embassy (New York,
1962) pp. 126-131. Kaznacheev was a political officer in Eurma.
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"1956," IA, January 1956, p. 5.
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lites would simply follow the line laid down in Moscow even
as they had under Stalin.
The Sixth Five Year Plan, already disseminated before
the Congress in draft form in the Soviet Union, was discussed
in the editorial. The Plan's aims were to raise the living
standards of the Soviet people, to provide the direction for
overtaking the most advanced capitalist countries, and to
strengthen the forces working for an international d etent e .^9
The editorial then turned to the visit of Bulganin and Khrush-
chev to India. This visit was not only a success for the So-
viet foreign policy but a "great victory for peace and inter-
national friendship. " ^ Throughout 1955 it had been the Soviet
Union which led the way toward promoting peace, increasing
cooperation between all governments, and in working to "create
an atmosphere of mutual confidence."-^ If the new Five Year
Plan and the policies suggested by the style and rhetoric of
the Indian visit seemed to suggest a possible departure from
the course of promoting world revolution, in theory at least,
above all else the party congress a few weeks away would con-
firm it.
The XXth Party Congress of the CPSU was held from Ik to
25 February 1956.^ In duration and number of delegates it
did not differ significantly from the XlXth Party Congress,
but in style and substance it was a world away. The first
^ibid, p. 6. 5°Ibid, p. 13. 51 Ibid, p. ?.
oJ This and all subsequent information on the dates and
numbers attending Party Congresses is taken from John S. Hesh-
etar's The Soviet Polity (hew York, 1972) pp. I3I-I37.
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portent of things to come occurred at the opening of the
Congress during the period reserved for a silent pause in
memory of departed comrades. The name J. V, Stalin was sim-
ply included with the names of two minor foreign party offi-
cials. Nothing else was said.
The "turning point in international relations" was the
otchetnii doklad and its revelation of new Soviet domestic
and foreign policy lines. The dramatic changes that trans-
pired are best revealed by comparison with the otchetnii dok-
lad of the XlXth Party Congress. The doklad in 1952 was given
by Halenkov, with Stalin looking on, and was only one-forth
the length of the doklad at the XXth Party Congress. The XlXth
Congress version was bellicose throughout and revealed a siege
mentality: the section on the Soviet military was four times
as long as that of the XXth Congress. And always and every-
where the name Stalin appeared. In all three sections the
mood was somber. The first foreign policy task was to "con-
tinue the struggle against the preparation and unleashing
of another war,"^ In the section on the internal situation
of the USSR, emphasis was on heavy industry, economizing,
and military preparedness. The only specific mention of .
the United States in the doklad was mere observance of the
fact that the atom monopoly had been broken. The section
on the party called for more self-criticism and sterner dis-
cipline. The XlXth Party Congress ended with concluding re-
marks by Stalin himself, and these ended with the cry, "Down
53Current Soviet Policies, Vol.i, p. 106.
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with the warmongers ! " 5^
Nikita Khrushchev delivered the otchetnii doklad at the
XXth Party Congress and the break with the past was at once
proclaimed in the introduction. "The Party has boldly exposed
shortcomings in various spheres of economic, state and Party
activities, smashed obsolete ideas and resolutely swept aside
everything that had outlived its time and was hindering our
progress ." 55 Indeed much had changed in the Soviet Union
since Stalin's death, and outside changes were noticed as
well. "^e are confident that within a short time, historically
speaking, Great China will become an industrial country and
its agricultural production will reach a high level on the
basis of cooperatives . " 56 There was no hint that a rival had
been born. China was on the path of reaching the same level
as the Balkan countries. "The Soviet Union... is doing every-
thing to help the fraternal peoples of China establish a po-
werful industry of their own,"-'' but Khrushchev also added
"it is no longer necessary for each socialist country to de-
velop all branches of heavy industry . "5° This did not expli-
citly rule out the possibility of China's receiving nuclear
weapons, but it certainly precluded any assistance to China




, Vol.2, ed. Leo Gruilow (New
York, 1957) P. 29.
56 ibid, p. 30. 5? lbidt pt 30. 58Loc>Cit>
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It is clear that the Soviets still assumed that Moscow
could set the course of foreign relations for international
communism without consulting its fraternal allies. In fact,
at a party early in his regime, Khrushchev once stated in a
toast something to the effect that the United States and the
USSR were the only countries that mattered.-5" Such sentiments
were to find increasing voice in Soviet pronouncements of the
Khrushchev era.
In the internal situation section of the introduction
of the doklad Khrushchev advised the Soviets to improve their
own techniques by studying "the best that capitalist countries'
science and technology have to offer." There were of course
routine criticisms of the capitalist world which led to a re-
vealing glimpse of how important Khrushchev regarded China.
"Capitalism is steadily moving toward new economic upheavals, UJ-
and the most important problem facing the working classes in
the capitalist countries was the prevention of a new war.
These impending upheavals and sentiments of the working class-
es were responsible for "signs of a certain sobering up appear-
ing among influential Western circles
.
Ht> 3 Also changing modes
of Western thought was the fact that, as the Soviet Union gen-
erously allowed, "People's China and the independent Republic
of India have joined the ranks of the Great Powers. "° + Further,
59sir William hayter, The Kremlin and the Embassy (London,
1966) p. 43.
Current Soviet Policies, Vol.2, p. 31.
1





it was the Soviet Union, as opposed to the United States,
which enjoyed the "deep confidence and love /of/ the broad
masses of the Eastern countries." -^ Such patronizing, while
correctly stating the relative economic strength of these
countries to the Soviet Union , could not have been calcula-
ted to flatter nations that were two or three times as popu-
lous. Neither can the Chinese have been pleased to be ranked
in Soviet estimation with a non-Larxist neutral regime.
In the section on the international situation, Khrush-
chev's attention turned to the main problems, the European
situation and US-Soviet relations. The first foreign policy
task of the Soviet Union was to seek an improvement in rela-
tions among the Great Powers in order to offset a Washington-
Bonn axis which was now emerging and increasing the danger
of war. To this end "the establishment of firm friendly
i. ... , .1 - ..Urn
relations between the two largest powers of the world - the
USSR and the United States - would be of tremendous value in
strengthening world peace... "We want to hope that our peace-
ful aspirations will be more correctly appraised in the United
States and that matters will take a turn for the better.""''7
The new slogan would be not "Let's Arm" but "Let's Trade."""
This program was a long way from the violent abolition
of imperialism as the only way to peace. But then Russians
had come a long way from their revolution, as the Chinese had
not from theirs. Even more, Khrushchev denied that the Soviets
"have interfered or plan to interfere in the internal affairs




of countries where the capitalist order exists."
7 This
concession to capitalist, particularly US, interests seemed
to contradict another expressed, policy of promotion of "wars
of liberation" in developing countries which, having been
former colonies, were part of the capitalist order.
The principle of peaceful coexistence also took on
coloring quite different from the one of tactical necessity
Lenin had formulated in the early 1920' s. It was now "one of
the cornerstones of the foreign policy of the Chinese People
1 s
Republic" 70 as well as the Soviet Union and other fraternal
socialist countries. Khrushchev flatly declared "There are
only two ways: either peaceful coexistence or the most des-
tructive war in history. There is no third way. "71 Further,
war was not "merely an economic phenomenon" nor a "fatalistic
inevitability." 72 Contradictions, and the resulting wars
were, or had been held by Marxists, as the way in which the
sociel order would be renewed. New forces, however, were
now at work. Khrushchev even guardedly allowed "much that is
unique in socialist construction is being contributed by the
Chinese People's Republic.
'
73 There was, more importantly
though, a growth of sentiment for peace in the working class-
es of all countries. So strong had this become that "in
many capitalist countries... the working class £Tn conjunction
with certain peasantry, intellectuals, and patriot£7 has an




72Loc.Cit. 73 Ibid, p. 37-

lo
geois democracy into an instrument of genuinely popular will.."7^
Khrushchev concluded this first section of the doklad by point-
ing out that the first task of the Soviet Union in foreign
policy was the furtherance of peace and peaceful coexistence. y
Clearly there had been a decided change in the tone of Soviet
policy toward the United States. One reason for the near re-
versal in assessment of foreign policy priorities, i.e. from
preparation for the inevitable war to advocacy of peaceful
coexistence, was that Khrushchev seemed to have a more ration-
al fear of nuclear war than did Stalin. He also saw that Sta-
lin's belligerent policies toward the United States were win-
ning neither territory nor friends for the Soviet Union.
There had to be more, though, to prompt such heretofore heret-
ical statements as that US-'USSR relations could be friendly,
war between capitalist and socialist countries was not inev-
itable, or that parliamentary means alone could effect the
transition to socialism. Lenin's "Left-Wing" Communism pro-
vided the means to bring about such ideological change, but
the motive, as we shall see, had a great deal to do with Khrush-
chev's desire to bring the good life to the Soviet Union.
This would come to be called "goulash communism." The Sixth
Five Year Plan amply demonstrated Khrushchev's intent and gave
the standard the Soviet Union would use to measure its pro-
gress - US economic production.
The section of the otchetnii doklad on the internal situ-
ation of the USSR dealt largely with the already circulated
7^Ibid, p. 38. 75 Ibid, p. 38.
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draft of the Sixth Five Year Plan. Some highlights of that
plan will be given here and will show the preoccupation with
US achievements and a new emphasis on non-military production.
The USSR's "principal economic task" was "To overtake and
surpass the most highly developed capitalist countries in
per capita output."'" As at earlier Congresses, light (i.e.
consumer goods) and food industries were given last place in
a field of twenty-one industrial areas, but now specific tar-
gats were set c Although the advance of the economy was to
be "primarily of heavy industry" this emphasis was required
and was explained for solving the task of creating an abun-
dance of consumers* goods."'' One means that would be employed in.
effecting this increase sounded much like the capitalists'
profit motive, as it called for increased "personal mater-
ial interest of workers in the results of their work."'"
In the field of agriculture, Khrushchev - always proud
of his closeness to the soil - revealed ambitious economic
plans and made the most definite of plans for overtaking the
United States. He bagan by informing all governmental agri-
culture agencies that they had been following "a clearly wrong
79path."' 7 His solution involved, among other things, cultiva-
tion of hitherto fallow marginal lands, the "virgin lands"
program. In research he acknowledged that the United States
was much more advanced and that the Soviet Union had to buy
hybrid corn seed from the United States of America. He was
plainly annoyed by the chronic low productivity of Soviet





agriculture. "much more labor is expended in our country
than in the U.S.A. to produce a centner of milk or meat."
The avowed challenge was to surpass US agriculture. How dif-
ferent this was from the Chinese who were setting about com-
munization as their main agricultural goal.
In the third section of the doklad on Party affairs, a
rather oblique repudiation of Stalin was the subject. "It
was of cardinal importance to restore and strengthen in every
Do
way Lenin's principle of collective leadership.
"
u^ The cult
of the individual' had "led to serious defects in our work." 8 3
Khrushchev's conclusion to this section and the whole doklad
itself showed he knew how dramatic and upsetting his new ideas
were likely to be regarded. In anticipation of ideological
criticism he warned, "He who thinks that communism can be
built exclusively on propaganda, without practical day-to-day
efforts to increase the output and raise the well-being of
the working people, will find himself slipping down the path
of Talmud ism and pedantry." ^
The whole tone and substance of the otchetnii doklad
showed clearly that the United States was the country most on
Khrushchev's mind. It was the United States with whom the So-
viet Union must reduce tensions so as to ease the burden de-
fense spending placed on the Soviet economy. And it was a-
gainst the US economy that significant Soviet accomplishments
would ultimately have to be measured. As for other fraternal
socialist countries, including China, their economic problems





were their own. There was little suggestion that help from
the Soviet Union was forthcoming. The speeches on following
days were rather routine, and as always, supportive of the
otchetnii doklad . Malenkov, on the way down and now Minister
of Electrification, dutifully promised that in the new Five
Year Plan, Soviet electrical power production would surpass
the U.S.A. 's. 8 5
Soon all would be overshadowed by the dramatic Secret
Speech. The Soviet Union would never be the same again;
the genie was out of the bottle. Why the denunciation of
Stalin had to be so explicit and elaborate remains a mystery
unless one accepts the argument that a policy revision so
great was contemplated that a compxCi/c ureak with the pasu
had to be effected. Otherwise, Beria and his "Chekists"
could have been convenient scapegoats. Years later Khrushchev
would admit that such a strong castigation of one man rule
could well have been taken as a criticism of Mao Tse-tung.
The speech is remarkable, not only for its iconoclasm, but
for its absence of Marxist grounding. It was also a uni-lat-
eral de-throneraent of the man all communists had looked to as
a leader. This, as much as anything, would cause problems
for Moscow. Unfortunately for Western analysts, references
to foreign affairs, if any, appear to have been deleted from
the version of the Secret Speech made available to the West.
The XXth Party Congress ended a few days later and the
Communist world, and the Western world for that matter, was
85 Ibid, p. 80.
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never the same again. It was, as advertised, a turning point
in international relations. The most immediate reactions on
the international scene were the uprisings in Eastern Europe,
but there were far more profound consequences for the Soviet
Union. As the Sino-Soviet split reached an open controversy,
the Chinese would identify the XXth Party Congress and par-
ticularly the new foreign policies and the Secret Speech as
"the first step along the road of revisionism." In 1956,
however, all of the fraternal parties applauded the work of
the Congress. Mao is reported to have said that Khrushchev
had opened everyone's eyes.
In the West, the big news was the de-throneroent of Stalin
and the few facts and the widespread speculation about the
Secret Speech almost obscured the import of Khrushchev's
other policies as enumerated in the ochetnii doklad . One of
the more astute and careful Western observers who saw the
significance of both the de-Stalinization and the new policies
as well was G.F. Hudson. Like others, his major attention was
given to the Secret Speech. The de-Stalinization would not
have been so difficult for Mao to take, Hudson argued, had
not Peking also recognized that the Soviet Union was trying
fi7
to outflank China in Southeast Asia (see Kaznacheev's remarks
at the beginning of this chapter). In any event, there was
obviously " no longer a unified direction of the world com-
"Whence the Differences?" People's Daily , 27 Feb. 1963
as quoted in Floyd, p. 376.
7G.F. Hudson, "Moscow and Peiping: Seeds of Conflict?",
Problems of Communism, Vol.5 No. 6 (Nov-Dec 1?56), 19.

kQ
, . , it 8 8
munist movement as there used to be.
Hudson considered how the Soviet Union's new domestic
policies might affect its relations with China.
"Changes of
economic policy providing for concentration on the
production
of consumer goods might ease the economic and
social strains
of the Soviet Union," he wrote, "but they
must mean a reduc-
tion of the Soviet capacity to provide for the
urgent needs
of China's industrial expansion."
89 The Soviet Union had made
a clear departure from Stalin's policies
not only in domestic
concerns but in foreign affairs also. Khrushchev
felt that
some sort of understanding must be reached in
the contest for
supremacy with the United States that would effectively
pre-
clude a nuclear war. This would have the effect
of allowing
the Soviet. economy to be partially re-directed to
outproduce
the US economy in consumer and agricultural
goods.
It was becoming evident to some observers that
the new
Soviet policies, constructed with the United States
primarily
in mind, were being unfavorably regarded in Peking.
Indeed,
these policies could even be construed as threatening.
And the
Chinese experience with Western nations was not one
that would
inspire trust.
82i D id, p. 23.
89G.F. Hudson, "Mao and Moscow," Foreign Affairs, Vol.36
No.l (October 1957). P« 82 •

49
IV THE NEW DIRECTION
Soviet academicians and political scientists were quick
to incorporate the new themes of the XXth Party Congress into
their writings. International Affairs, the official Soviet
English language international relations journal, published
an editorial in March 1956 on "The Contribution of the 20th
Congress of the CPSU to the Treasure House of Marxism-Lenin-
ism. "90 The editorial stressed the peaceful nature of the
new competition with capitalism. The idea of any Soviet
interference in the internal affairs of another country was
scoffed at. The Soviet economy was to overtake the capital-
ists* as quickly as possible so that higher standards of
living would be realized." The editorial also foresaw that
Soviet policy moves would be dismissed as an instrumental
tactic following precepts outlined in "Left-Wing" Communism
,
i.e. temporary policies to gain some mass allies. "Peaceful
co-existence is not a tactical maneuver," the editorial pro-
tested, "it is the general line of foreign policy of the
Soviet Union." 92
The idea of peaceful coexistence became the predominant
theme in the policy statements for the rest of the year. The
Soviets went to great length to advertise this. The supposed
success in establishing the 'peace zone* in Europe, of which
Khrushchev had spoken at the Party Congress, was advanced as
93
one of the reasons for the dissolution of the Cominform, J
9
°IA, March 1956, pp. 5-l6.
91 Ibid, p. 6. 92 Ibid, p. 11. 93Floyd, p. 235.

50
Peaceful coexistence was even included in the orthodox pre-
scription for relations between fraternal socialist countries
and for countries friendly to them, e.g. India. This formu-
lation (originated by China, incidentally) was promulgated
as the Five Principles of International Relations. They were:
1) respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, 2) non-
aggression, 3) non-interference in internal affairs on eco-
nomic, ideological or political grounds (this a month before
Hungary!), k) mutual benefit and equality, and, of course,
qh.
5) peaceful co-existence. 7 The campaign to promote this
line was orchestrated to coincide with and support another
policy objective, the dismantlement of overseas US bases.
The earliest international repercussions to the CPSU's
"turning point of international relations" came in Eastern
Europe in the form of rebellions in Poland and then Hungary.
The Soviet response in Hungary was overwhelming, once the So-
viets decided to act. At the height of the Red Army's inva-
sion of Hungary there were more Soviet tanks in Budapest than
Patton had had in his entire Third Army a dozen years earlier.
In Poland more subtle tactics were employed. What accounts
for the difference in treatment of the Polish and Hugarian
situations? The Chinese later said that Khrushchev followed
their advice<5 The Soviets did consult with the Chinese be-
9^E. A. Korovin, "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,"
IA, May 1956, p. 46.
^Harold C. Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest (Bloomington,
Ind., 1972) p. 81.
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fore the invasion of Hungary, but it is not safe to conclude,
in spite of later Chinese claims, that it was Peking* s pro-
ise of support which allowed the Soviets to move so boldly
against the second satellite uprising.
There are three factors aside from the specific ingred-
ients of each rebellion which enabled the Soviets to take
the action they did in Hungary in I956 with less risk of war
than might have been supposed. The Soviet invasion took place
on 30 October 1956, one day after the French and British-spon-
sored Israeli invasion of the Sinai. World attention was not
shifted to European events until the Soviets had achieved
their fait accompli
.
Next, the strategic importance of Hungary
to the Soviet Union was different from that of Poland because
of the geography. Even supposing the Polish government would
have wanted to leave the socialist camp, she would still be
surrounded by the Soviet Union, Czechoslavakia, and East Ger-
many. But a non-aligned Hungary would leave a gap, albeit a
small one, in the line of East European satellites buffering
the Soviet border.
One more important difference, also geographical, would
certainly have figured in the Soviet equation. Hungary is
land-locked, and any confrontation of Soviet forces by NATO
powers would mean challenging the numerically superior Red
Army. Poland, on the other hand, had a flank open to the sea,
and the Soviet Navy of 1956 was not the equal of the army in
terms of its strength with respect to the NATO navies. Look-
ing ahead, it will be instructive to keep these same factors

in mind when considering Soviet response to the Taiwan
Straits crisis in 1958.
The revolt in Hungary and near-revolt in Poland re- intro-
duced, for a while, a more militant note to Soviet commentary
than had been common at the XXth Congress. "New socialist
homelands have appeared /viz. China7 whose defence, like the
defence of the Soviet Union, is the supreme international duty
of the working people of the world."" It was even apparently
necessary to add what would have gone without saying a few
years earlier, "The role of the Soviet Union as the leading
97force of the world socialist system is quite natural."
The theme of relaxation of tensions was not abandoned, however,
the commentary also noted that in recent troubling events,
Hungary and Suez, it was the socialist countries under Soviet
leadership which had maintained "the struggle for a detente "
98
with the United States. In an interview in November of
1957 Khrushchev asserted that "The winding up of military
bases abroad is one of the most important issues in solving
the problem of disarmament and the relaxation of international
tensions . " "'
The Moscow Declaration of November 1957 saw the height
of this resurgence of old-style communism. There was no talk
of sober Western statesmen, but rather of unspecified "belli-
9 6G. A. Deborin, "A Turning Point in International Rela-
tions," IA, September 1957, p. 4?.
97 Ibid, p. 48. 98 Ibid, p. 50.
9077,1Khrushchev Interview," IA, November 1957, p. 15.
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cose imperialist maniacs." As far as ideological move-
ments, "the main danger at present is revisionism... however
dogmatism and sectarianism can also be the main danger at
101different phases of development in one party or another."
This relatively hard line was the result of the Chinese col-
lecting debts for their support of Soviets in the Eastern
European troubles. The Chinese later charged that, but for
their insistence, there would have been no condemnation of
1 o?imperialism at all. The Chinese had also argued for the
supremacy of the Soviet Union in the international communist
movement. In view of differences between the two countries
later to be revealed, China's support of Moscow's claim to
leadership even after de-Stalinization and increased Soviet
contacts with the United States seems inconsistent unless
one credits the notion that Mao had in mind taking over an
intact communist community rather than a splintered one.
A Sino-Soviet partnership, for such Moscow had allowed
it to become by seeking Peking's support for its actions in
controlling Poland and Hungary, continued through the summer
of 1958. A Moscow-Peking hard line was especially manifest
against Yugoslavia, but when the subject came to the United
States, Khrushchev was more restrained. The Soviets had
displayed a specialized technical virtuosity in the Sputnik
launchings. The implications such feats had for delivery of





Berton, Vol.11 "Origin of Differences," p. 9/6, 10.
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might have done with such an advantage or what the Chinese
did want Khrushchev to do, there was a relatively modest tone
to Soviet statements referring to the feat.
In an interview in January of 1958 Khrushchev demonstrated
this moderation, contenting himself the observation that "as
for the military side of the problem /balance of force_i7 the
successful launching of the Sputniks with the help of the
intercontinental ballistic rocket speaks for itself and scarcely
needs any extensive comment." 10 -^ In a re-election speech to his
electoral constituency in March of 1958, he told his audience
that Soviet planners might well pay more attention to working
104
conditions than to Sputniks, In May he told an audience in
Cairo, "While rejoicing at these Z?pace7 achievements of Soviet-
science and engineering, we do not want in any way to humiliate
the United States, still less to insult it," and added, "I
should very much like to be correctly understood in the United
States. We do not doubt in any way the United States' achieve-
lCK
ments in industry, science, and engineering." J Mao had ear-
lier exulted that the East Wind had prevailed over the West
Wind, but Khrushchev did not seem so sure of his superiority.
The Chinese were becoming impatient with the Soviet failure
to exploit what seemed an obvious military advantage. As will
be seen below, the Chinese tested Soviet resolve in the Fall
of 1958 and made one last appeal to Soviet revolutionary
spirits in the Spring of i960.
A
^Khrushchev, For Victory in Feaceful Competition with
Capitalism (New York, I960) p." 24.





An interesting exchange between Tito and Khrushchev
showed the latter* s estimate of the existing strategic balance.
When the Soviets took Yugoslavia to task for seeking US aid,
the Yugoslavs promptly retorted that so had the Soviets. In a
speech in Moscow Khrushchev replied: "Rest assured, Comrade
Tito, that Khrushchev did not ask for handouts. He spoke as
equal to equal.
"
10° Events in the Summer of 1958, one of
which occurred only a few days after his 13 July speech were
to demonstrate that Khrushchev did in fact feel equal and
not superior to the United States, Sputnik notwithstanding.
The revolution in Iraq brought the Mid-East to a boil,
and the American response was a quick placement of troops in
Lebanon and the deployment of the US Sixth Fleet into the
eastern Mediterranean. The Soviets seemed caught off guard
and could only talk of sending volunteers to Iraq and man-
euver troops inside the Soviet - Union. Khrushchev sent a rather
mild note to President Eisenhower. "We address you not from
a position of intimidation but from a position of reason.
We believe at this momentous hour it would be more reasonable
not to bring the heated atmosphere to a boiling point; it is
1 07
sufficiently inflammable as it is." '
Peking was not impressed by Khrushchev's tame response
to US actions. The Chinese and Soviet actions in this crisis
provide one of the first indications that fundamental policy
106 Ibid, p. 601.
1 07
r As quoted in D. S. Zagoria, The Sino-3ovlet Conflict:
1956-1961 (New York, 196^) p. 198.

56
differences existed between the two communist states. On 23
July, Khrushchev accepted an Eisenhower proposal to discuss
the Mid-East crisis in the Security Council. Then from 31
July to 3 August, Khrushchev made a visit, his second, to
Peking. A Joint communique after the meeting spoke of a
"complete identity of views" and generally denounced "sabre-
rattling imperialist maniacs." On his return to Moscow,
Khrushchev withdrew his acceptance of a Security Council sum-
mit and demanded the admission of Communist China to the Uni-
10Qted Nations. 7 The obvious influence that Peking had, for
the moment, over Khrushchev must have made Mao and other Chi-
nese leaders question the nature of Khrushchev's resolve.
Robert North argues that the crisis in the Taiwan Straits
was
in September engendered by Peking to demonstrate to them-
selves and anyone else, once and for all, exactly where the
Soviets stood with respect to the methods for dealing with
the United States. If so, the answer was not long in com-
ing. During the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu the Soviet govern-
ment did not make any serious threats to the United States un-
til after it became obvious that no major commitment of forces
was being planned. Only then began the ritual denunciations
of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek and his "clique" (the
word always associated with him: Soviet propaganda, does have
an ear for euphony). Typical of Khrushchev's rather mild post-
crisis statements on Taiwan was one given to a Brazilian jour-
108.,
. _
1 °9 TV^. JIveesmg, p. 15, Ibid, p. 15.
110Robert North, Moscow and the Chinese Communists (Stan-
ford, 1963) p. 280.
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nalist days after the crisis. " /jh£J United States must stop
interfering in the internal affairs of the Chinese People's
Republic and withdraw 8.11 its forces from the Taiwan area."
No "or elses." Khrushchev enumerated some of the items of
dispute between the United States and China but added "but
we consider that these differences and clashes should not
lead to war." 111
Why did the Soviets demonstrate so clearly their un-
willingness to come to the aid of a threatened fraternal
socialist state? In the first place, the Soviet Union was
not threatened and the Soviets were not about to risk con-
frontation with the United States in a war over someone else's
territory. They never have; Korea shows that well enough.
Even if Soviets had perceived a potential threat to the USSR,
the geography of the situation permitted the United States to
deploy the one element of force which was markedly superior
to its Soviet counterpart, the United States Navy. Short of
all-out war, the Soviets could not respond to the situation
by military means with any confidence of superiority. And
Nikita Khrushchev did not want to rick a nuclear war, espec-
ially over some disputed waters off the Chinese coast.
The reuniting of Soviet and Chinese interests which events
in Eastern Europe had forced in late 195& was at an end. It
ended because Moscow and Peking held such contrary views of
both the military strength and resolve of the United States
and the consequences of a nuclear war. Khrushchev and the




Kremlin leadership had seen their painfully constructed Soviet
state nearly destroyed by Nazi Germany, There was something
to lose. His experiences in the war and his subsequent frus-
trations in attempting to overtake the United States' economy
put Khrushchev in a position to appreciate American technology
as Mao, steeped in the modes and ways of agrarian Asia, never
could.
The Soviets had first-hand experience with nuclear wea-
pons, and perhaps the size of their own weapons had given
them pause. Robert Conquest has suggested that a fifty mega-
ton blast was enough to penetrate into the "ideological bone
curtain" of Soviet heads, but not yet enough to have an im-
pact on the Chinese, *2 jjao could lose half his population
in nuclear war and still be left with three hundred million
people. There was no industrial base to lose. The question
of what to do about the United States was a fundamental point
of departure.
Several Soviet books on international relations published
in 1958 reveal that the essential course of Soviet policy af-
ter the XXth Party Congress had not been changed by the dis-
ruptions in Eastern Europe nor by the Mid-East or Taiwan
Straits crisis. The Minister of Agitation and Propaganda,
L. F. llichev, edited one work in which the faithful were in-
formed that "only sectarians and dogmatists /Tike the anti-
party group*7 are not able to understand that, in the present
112




conditions of living Marxism-Leninism in action, the struggles
of communism are manifested in the conversion to life of the
113decisions of the XXth Party Congress. ,: -* Ilichev himself re-
stated this argument in the terms of * Left-Wing Communism the
following year, and used it in a context that made it clear
he now also considered the Chinese as sectarians and dogma-
tists .
A book by Academician M.A. Kapitsa on the history of
Sino-Soviet relations, aside from ritual protestations of
historic and firm friendship, contained a rather interesting
analysis of each's contributions to the Korean War. The com-
bined response of the two fraternal socialist powers was, of
course, "a clear demonstration of brotherly solidarity" in the
114
face of US aggression. Yet .. the author still felt called upon
to explain why it was that hundreds of thousands of Chinese
soldiers had fought and died outside their homeland while only
a comparative handful of Russian advisors were in Korea. The
reason for such a disproportionate commitment of Chinese man-
power was that it was Chinese and not Soviet airspace that had
lie
been violated by US aircraft. J If the Chinese had aided the
North Koreans by committing large numbers of troops, he reasoned,
the Soviets had made an equal contribution by their protests and
113^
S. Sanakoev, "Movy Tip Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii," in
Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenil (Moscow, 1958) PP. 1^7-48. All trans-
lations from Russian language sources are mine.
11^






and speeches at the United Nations. Kapitsa made no mention
of the Soviets selling the the Chinese the rifles with which
they fought. This casual equation of Soviet words with Chinese
lives in the fight against US imperialist aggression under-
scores the fundamentally different attitudes of the two coun-
tries toward the proper way to deal with the United States.
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V XXI st PARTY CONGRESS - THE ROADS DIVERGE
The XXIst Party Congress of the CPSU met from 27 January
until 5 February 1959. It was an extraordinary Congress because
not
it didA elect a new Central Committee. Khrushchev meant to pro-
long the life of the Central Committee which had overridden
his ouster by the "anti-party" group. The whole tone of the
pronouncements of this Congress, especially when compared with
its predecessor, is one of caution, consolidation, and moder-
ation. The ochetnii doklad was in large part devoted to explain-
ing why a new Seven Year Plan was replacing the existing Five
Year Plan which had only run two years. Ostensibly, the reason
was that new, and unspecified, technological advances had now
made longer-range planning possible. It was also noted, though,
that the new plan had been drawn up so as to be capable of ful-
fillment "without overstrain." Clearly the economic compe-
tition with the United States was straining Soviet resources.
The "triumphs" of the Soviet economy since the XXth Congress
were noticeably not compared with US figures. The Soviet target
dates for surpassing the US economy in total volume and per
117
capita production were pushed back several years, and later
in the doklad, Khrushchev even denied that he was using the
United States as an economic yardstick. However, he did quote
Western and particularly US sources on the successes of pre-
vious Soviet economic planning.
Current Soviet Policies
, Vol. 3, ed. Leo Gruilow (New
York, 19t>6T"p\ 50.
117 118
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In the section of the doklad on the international situation
Khrushchev took a rather conciliatory approach toward the United
States. The Taiwan Straits crisis was dissassociated from any
Soviet actions and Khrushchev, while on the subject of Asia,
called for the extension of an atom-free "zone of peace" to
the ^JFar.East and the entire Pac ific Basin as well as Europe," 119
(original emphasis). It was only later revealed by the Chinese
that Khrushchev had promised them nuclear arms in 1957. To Mao,
the promised weapons must now have seemed merely a bargaining
chip in the conduct of US-Soviet relations.
Turning his attention specifically toward the United States,
Khrushchev reasoned that "we should not go to war because of
120
our divergent views." Then came an even more strikir~l"
unideological statement, "Our two countries have never had and
do not have any territorial claims against one another. There
are no grounds for clashes between our peoples, yet the relations
between the USSR and the U.S.A. have long been abnormal." 121 one
logical inference Peking might reasonably draw from this state-
ment was that Moscow felt it was more likely that there were
grounds for clashes with China than with the United States.
Finally, Khrushchev noted, as a sign of what the US-Soviet
relationship could promise, that the trade of the Soviet Union
with the United States and Western Europe had tripled from 1950
to 1958.
On Party matters, the unspoken but well understood impli-
119 Ibid, p. 59. 120Ibid, p. 60. 121 lbid, p. 61.
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cations of the Chinese "Great Leap Forward" were dealt with,
Khrushchev denounced the ideological errors of such undertak-
ings somewhat obliquely. "The transition from the socialist
stage of development to the higher phase /viz. communism7 is
a logical process that one cannot arbitrarily violate or by-
1 22
pass." Still, the Soviets were required to answer the chal-
lenge of greater ideological purity posed by the Chinese Com-
munists, Surpassing the United States in economic development
could certainly not be realized by such experimentation with
Utopian forms that Peking was sponsoring so, to combat this
ideological offensive of the Chinese, it became necessary for
Moscow in turn to formulate some specifics on the attainment
of communism. These specifics would provide the ideological
rationale for Moscow's course. The answer developed, as ex-
pressed in the doklad , was that all countries would reach
12 "}
communism more or less at the same time. J And that time
would be when the Soviet Union did, not before. There were
no short-cuts. The emphasis on material production rather than
ideologically pure procedures would continue in the Soviet
Union. Mao issued a statement praising Khrushchev's "correct
leadership" at the Congress but said nothing about the pro-
124posed atom- free zone.
In the year 1959 1 two main irritants to Sino-Soviet
relations were the Soviet Union's neutrality in the Sino-Indian
border disputes and, equally, Khrushchev's visit to the United
States. The very fact of his presence in the heartland of the
122 Ibid, p. 64.
123
Ibid, p. 68. 124 Ibid, p. 112.
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Imperialist arch-foe spoke more than any words could about the
Soviet leader's view of and un-Marxist fascination with the
United States. But some words of Khrushchev were to be simply
too much for Peking. On his return to the Soviet Union on
28 September, he told a crowd at the Moscow airport that "Pres-
ident Eisenhower of the United States has displayed wise states-
manship in assessing the present international situation, . .
.
12 5he has displayed courage and willpower." Of course this
praise of Eisenhower was designed to underscore the importance
of Khrushchev himself in his countrymen's eyes. He was demon-
strating that he, and he alone, of all socialist leaders could
deal with and was trusted by the leadership of the Soviet Union's
v>inr.1 r.nv» n^irfivcovu T1 Vl o PhlVlOCP T.*TOT*r> m O +" T TnTiTP Q Q pH &Y>r\ "1 £* I" f> T*
said that "no considerations of diplomatic protocol can explain
away or excuse Khrushchev's tactless eulogy of Eisenhower and
other imperialists."
Two days after his return to the Soviet Union, Khrushchev
was in Peking for his third visit there and it was likely that
he was asked by Mao why it had been necessary to speak of the
leader of the capitalist gangsters in such a way. Terse and
noncommittal communiques from Peking about the talks between
the two leaders showed that no reconciliation had been effected
this time. Even while Khrushchev had still been in the United
States the Chinese had pointedly removed the pro-Soviet Defense
12







The dilemma now faced by Khrushchev was summed up by G.F.
Hudson as one growing out of the revolutionary mission imposed
by communism and the increasing embourgeoisement of the Soviet
Union. ' It was necessary at the same time to preach "peace-
ful coexistence" to the West and anti-imperialism to the Party
at home and the other fraternal parties abroad. Pressure could
be put on Khrushchev to produce results in diplomatic activities
that were now beyond his capability since he had all but re-
nounced war as a means of policy (he never ruled out "wars of
national liberation" ) . His response was to seek an increase
of production of material goods at home; stymied on the diplo-
matic front he would try for success on the economic front. As
Hudson had observed before, however (see above, p. 4-8), this
left little hope for contributions to China's economic develop-
ment
.
In January of i960, Pravda published Khrushchev's comments
on his recent annual report to the Supreme Soviet. There was a
striking reversion in style and substance to the ochetnii doklad
of the XXth Congress. The Soviet economy was again being com-
pared directly with the US economy over which it had acquired
"a considerable edge... in rates of industrial development."
In terms of an old cliche, the Soviet Union was outproducing
127G.F. Hudson, "Russia and China: The Dilemmas of Power,"
Foreign Affairs , Vol. 39 No. 1 (October, i960) p. 3.
128Curren t Digest of the Soviet Pres s (CDSP) , Vol. XII
No. 2, p. 5.
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the United States in butter as well as. guns. In fact, as far
as Soviet planners were now concerned, "the only argument con-
cerns how many times faster we are moving than the United States
of America and how long it will take us to catch up with that
12Q
country." In the area of international relations, Khrushchev
compared the existing situation favorably with 1952-53, the
last years of Stalin. Progress had been satisfactory in "the
noble cause of creating trust in the relations between the
U.S.A. nad the Soviet Union." 130 The most important task for
Soviet foreign policy was to "so arrange matters that the
inevitable struggle between them /capitalist and socialist
pcwers7 takes the form exclusively of a struggle between ideo-
logies, of peaceful rivalry - nr coumoti tinv1 M 131 f nWT,v,00 i e
added). What had happened to the inevitability of violence
in that struggle? The answer to that question was that one
"must not now repeat mechanically what Vladimir Ilyich Lenin
said about imperialism many decades back." 132
The U-2 incident did not seriously weaken Khrushchev*
s
increasingly firm conviction that it was the United States
and the Soviet Union who alone would decide the course of
international affairs. "The Soviet Union and the United States
are great world powers. History itself has assigned them that
role. How the international situation develops from now on...
«9iMd f p . 5 . I30lbld§ p> 6> i3l Ibld> ^ i6<
132CDSP, Vol. XII No. 25, p. 8.
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is in large part up to our two powers." 1^
In an article in Pravda commemorating the fortieth anni-
versary of the publication of " Left- Wing" Communi^ peaceful
coexistence with the United States was elevated from the status
of a logical extrapolation from Lenin's thought to an implicit
statement of the original text. "Some people mistakenly regard
the policy of working for peaceful co-existence of countries
with different political systems, of struggling to put an end
to the arms race and to strengthen peace and friendship among
peoples, and of talks between leaders of socialist and capitalist
countries as a kind of departure from the positions of Marxism-
Leninism." These are the "left-sectarian sentiments and tenden-
cies against which Lenin's book is leveled." 1^ Just as c1eeT.lv
it was the Chinese against whom the Pravda article was leveled.
In April of I960 the Chinese also published an article on
Lenin and it has been regarded by many, Zbigniew Brzezinski
being one of the first, as the final appeal by Peking to Moscow
to return to the paths of ideological righteousness, i.e. anti-
imperialism. Published as an editorial by Hongq i ( Red Flag ).
"Long Live Leninism" was far more than the celebration of the
correctness of Lenin's thought that it appeared to be. ^5 Screen.
ing out the conventional rhetoric, one finds the following argu-
ment developed in the article: "The Soviet Union has left.
133 Ibid, p. 7.
134
of .r^/;/la^VSky ' "°n the F°rtieth Anniversary of Publication0 'J£ftr y/lns« Communism," CDSP, Vol. XII No. 24, p, 8.
No. IM^fiSl^O^. 1^^1"'" ^^-^^. Vol. II!

68
the United States behind, too, in technology
." 136 Furthermore,
Marx had shown that all technological advances must inevitably
work to the overthrow of capitalism. This being so, the argu-
ment runs, the Soviet Union is now absolutely required by the
dialectic of history to force concessions from the United
States. Peaceful coexistence ought not to be communism's prin-
ipal aim. ^7 Brzezinski concludes, "the Chinese therefore felt
duty-bound to infuse international communism with the will to
prevail." 138
What disturbed the Soviets most about the editorial was
the comparatively nonchalant way the Chinese urged that "the
proletariat... must prepare for... non-peaceful development of
the revolution." 139 Most distressing of all was the apparent
illingness of the Chinese to accept a world-wide nuclear war
so that socialism could "build a beautiful future" on the "debris
of dead imperialism."
111" The Kremlin replied immediately for
too many of the leadership had seen Russia, their socialist
Russia, laid waste by the Nazis. They were not willing to risk-
lightly a thermo-nuclear war with the United States.
In that same year, I960, several books were published by
the Academy of Social Sience and by the Institute for Foreign
Relations under the auspices of the Central Committee CPSU
which showed examples of the scholarship that was being encour-
w
136 Ibid, p. 7. 137 Ibid, p. 11.
138Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Challenge of Change in the
Soviet Bloc," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 39 No. 3 (April, 1961), p. VJl
.
139
"Long Live Leniism," p. 19.
lZ|0 Ibid, p. 12.
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aged to support the Soviet line toward the United States. A
publication of the Academy of Social Sciences surveying US
foreign policy from 1953-56 predictably condemned the policy
but did so with significant omissions. The "militarization and
expansionist course of US foreign policy" was primarily due
to the need to bolster a sagging economy and ease unemployment.
There was no mention, however, of any "capitalist encirclement"
and the "positions of strength" doctrine was treated as an aber-
ration specifically of John Foster Dulles and not, by implication
of President Eisenhower. 1 ^ 1 A book outlining the Party* s current
program gave a new version of Khrushchev's position on the
Taiwan Straits crisis that he had taken at the XXIst Party
Congress two years earlier in 1958. It was now asserted that it
was Soviet restraint as well as resolve that had produced the
successful (non-belligerent) resolution of the crisis. As for
Khrushchev's visit to the United States in 1959. its central
idea was to show that "the Soviet Union and the United States
/woul_d7 be able to live in peace and friendship, that there are
no insurmountable obstacles to peaceful co-existence." ^
Perhaps the most authoritative book to be published in
the Soviet Union that year was Boris N. Ponomarev's History of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which, curiously enough,
1 1Nekotorye Voprosy Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii
, A.I.
Schneerson and V.M. Kulakov eds. (Moscow, 195b) i PP- 224-226.
1 ^' 2G.A. Deborin, "Hezhdunarodnoe Znachenie XXI C'ezda KPSS ,
"
in V Borbe Za Realizatsiiu Heshenii XXI C 'ezda KPSS (Moscow, i960)
P. 393.
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was to avoid getting into nuclear war with the United States
while trying to spread socialism. China had learned this in
1958 in the Taiwan Straits crisis. This Soviet policy led
to the adoption and embellishment of some rather minor Lenin-
ist theses on peaceful coexistence. Much of Lenin's writing >
unfortunately, had dealt with the necessity of war or vio-
lence to restructure society. To reveal Lenin as the advo-
cate of peaceful coexistence, it was necessary to explain
aviay Lenin's writings on war. Thus, "Lenin formulated his
theses about the inevitability of wars in the epoch of imper-
ialism at a time when first, capitalism was the only and all-
embracsing world system, and second, when the social and po-
litical forces that had no interest in and were o^^osed to
war were weak, poorly organized, and hence unable to compel
the imperialists to renounce war." 1 But the balance of
forces had now changed enough toward the socialist side that
peaceful, not violent, revolution was the true Leninist poli-
cy. So it was possible now th argue that "During all the
changes in the complex international situation Zl953-195j[7
the Party firmly followed the Leninist general line in the
sphere of Soviet foreign policy - to ensure the peaceful
co-existence of countries with different social and economic
systems." ' This, in brief, was the Soviet position offered
to the national delegations at Bucarest. The Chinese were
1 U£>
°Ponomarev, History of CPSU, p. 665.
l47 Ibid, p. 722.
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not convinced, but were unprepared to give a detailed rebuttal.
It was the issue of peaceful coexistence which had proved
the most intractable to the Chinese, As long as there were
imperialists there would be the danger of war. No other read-
ing of Lenin was possible to their thinking. Although the
conference ended with the appearance of unity, the Soviets
soon showed how far relations between the two countries had
deteriorated. On 16 July I960, the Soviets began the with-
drawal of all their technicians working in China. They left
148taking their blueprints with them .
In November of i960 a conference of eighty-one Commu-
nist and Workers* Parties was held in Moscow. Here, for the
first tirnej the dispute between China and the Soviet Union
was formally brought into the forum of an interparty assembly
and the fraternal parties were now asked to take sides in the
internecine struggle. Moscow generally carried the day as the
Declaration of the Conference was signed by all and the appear-
ance of unity was preserved. Several statements in the Declar-
ation of the Conference, a condemnation of revisionism, excor-
iation of US imperialism, and support of national liberation
wars represented victories for Chinese viewpoints. ' On the
other hand, the re-emphasis of peaceful coexistence and many
qualifying remarks throughout ensure that the Declaration,
like so many other works in the Marxist-Leninist canon, would
148Keesing, p. 29.
1^9Berton, Vol.11, "Origin of Differences," p. 9/6, 10.
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be used by both sides to support their positions. This be-
came evident immediately.
The new year, 196l, saw Khrushchev at a Kremlin party
proposing a toast "to improving our relations with the United
States of America, because an improvement in relations among
all states of the world depends to a large extent on improve-
ment in relations between our two countries." ** It is hard
to see how such an improvement could also have improved Sino-
Soviet relations. Khrushchev's comments on the conference
of eighty-one parties were given in a speech a few days later.
Khrushchev acknowledged one of the lines of the recent
declaration, that imperialism still possessed great strength.
But in that acknowledgement of imperialist strength lay one
of the ambiguities characteristic of the declaration. To
the Chinese it meant that imperialism, and specifically the
United States, was not about to give up its evil reactionary
ways even though military preponderance, demonstrated by
Sputni k launches, was now in favor of the socialist camp.
To the Soviets, on the other hand, it meant that imperialism
was rotting away on the inside but still possessed "nuclear
teeth." On the subject of war resulting from the contradic-
tions of capitalism, Khrushchev observed "/a/ conclusion /that7
world war is an indispensible condition for the further inten-
sification of the crisis of capitalism" would be "profoundly
wrong J' l^l in fact , "Prevention of a New War - the Question of
1^°CDSP
.
Vol. XIII No.l, p. 2.
151"0n Results of the Conference of Representatives of
Communist and Workers Parties," CDSP , Vol. XIII No. 3, p , i\ ,
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All Questions" was the title of a section of his remarks. 1 ^ 2
The fear of nuclear war with the United States was also played
upon in providing the rationale for Soviet backing down on
each of several ultimatums over Berlin. "We invariably seek
to direct the development of events in such a way that, de-
fending the interests of the socialist camp, we do not allow
the imperialist provacateurs to start a new war."^^
Solidarity and unity of the socialist movement were also
stressed in Khrushchev's remarks. Deviations of both revision-
ism and dogmatism were denounced, but it was only against dog-
matists and sectarians (i.e. Chinese) that the words of Sta-
lin were invoked. As far as any disputes between parties,
the CP3U could boast of its "invariable striving to strengthen
1 Sof-ties of fraternal friendship with the CPC." ^
Meanwhile Khrushchev, determined to have his scheduled
summit meeting, made preparations to meet President Kennedy
in Geneva in June of 1964. In order to impress on fellow
Soviets the significance of his ability to handle Western
statesmen, he began to speak favorably of Kennedy as he had
done of Eisenhower in 1959= In lAay he spoke of "new leaders"
who would take a "more sensible approach to the adjustment of
international crisis." 1" Turning to specifics a few days
later, he said "President Kennedy and I... must find a com-
1 ^ 2CDSP, Vol. XIII No. 4, p. 2.
1
^ibid, p. 10. 1 ^Ibid, p. 15.
x
-^Khrushchev, Communism - Peace and happiness for the
Peoples
, 2 Vols. (Moscow, 1963) p. 110.
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raon language In our internal relations and work for peaceful
co-existence . "-'-5° Unless President Kennedy were to be con-
verted to Marxist thought, any "common language" found would
obviously have to include elements of capitalist thought.
Peking, always ready to point up ideological deviations,
would be only too ready to call any compromises to Moscow's
attention. This did not seem to deter Khrushchev in the least.
After the summit he continued in his praise of the capitalist
leader and millionaire.
"President Kennedy /at the meeting/ appreciated the
great responsibility devolving upon the governments of two
such powerful states." 1 ^' This theme was useful to show that
he, Khrushchev, was the one man vrho had the measure of Western
leaders, who could deal with them, find a common language as
it were. This was of importance to all the world for "it is
on the state of the Soviet-American relations that the inter-
national situation as a whole depends in many respects ."^-^o
And these relations would be based on "mutual understanding
and friendship not simply peace! " ^( emphasis in original)
The Chinese may be pardoned for wondering where in Lenin's
works "mutual understanding and friendship" was proposed as
a basis for relations between socialism and imperialism.
The following month Soviet technicians were recalled
from Albania, and Soviet-Yugoslav
.
talks were begun. This was
the beginning of a phase in the growing Sino-Soviet dispute
in which attacks were made on proxies. When the Soviets





wished to criticize Mao and China they would say Hoxha and
Albania. On the Chinese side, Khrushchev and the Soviet Union
were denounced through attacks on Tito and Yugoslavia.
Since the XXth Congress, Khrushchev's policies, insofar
as they involved his view of the United States, had two aspects;
the idea of a shared world leadership with the United States,
and a competition to surpass the American, economy. The Mid-East
crisis of 1958 and the U-2 incident were only temporary inter-
ruptions to Khrushchev's tendency to avoid direct military
confrontations or their threat. He preferred to operate in what
seemed to be the more predictable sphere of economic competition.
One event taken as a particularly pleasing sign of the Soviet
Union' s economic progress was Yuri Gagarin's space flight,
Khrushchev boasted at a reception for Gagarin that the USSR
would soon surpass the economic level of the United States.
The Soviets, he said1 had made a flight around the world, the
Americans but a jump. After the first flush of success had
passed, Khrushchev regained a sense of perspective and reminded
the Soviet people that the Soviet Union was, however, "as yet
behind the U.S. in economic development." The Soviet Union's
striving to overtake the US economy was perfectly in line with
peaceful coexistence. "Our desire to overtake is no threat,"
Khrushchev insisted „ Peking now had an answer to the challenge
it had raised in "Long Live- Leninism. " As the Chinese had feared,











The X>Cth Party Congress of the CPSU had revealed a new
Soviet approach to international and domestic problems. The
directions taken in both areas turned on points involving the
United States. In international relations the Soviets preached
peaceful coexistence and were seeking some less threatening
management of conflict with the United States, some form of
detente (this word began to appear in Soviet English- language
translations of their publications in 1956). In domestic affairs
the Soviets wished simply to outproduce the US economy. These
goals increasingly appeared to the Chinese to have less and
less to do with Marxist-Leninist revolutionary action, a course
to which they were officially deeply committed : In fact, this
whole development of Soviet policy, as some Western observers
saw, could only be perceived in Peking as a threat to China
itself. Rhetoric to that effect was not long in coming.
Events following the XXth Congress, particularly the revolts
in East Europe, had forced the Soviets to rely on Chinese sup-
port and follow a course tolerated by Peking, but this was
only temporary. The Taiwan Straits crisis showed just how
far the Soviet Union was willing to tie its interests to China.
As time passed, Khrushchev became convinced of the essential
correctness of his policies even as Mao was convinced of their
basic deviation. Both wanted to see a socialist world order.
Khrushchev feared the consequences of engaging in a thermo-
nuclear war with the United States. Mao did not. Khrushchev
l6
^Hudson, "Russia and China," p. 10.
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respected and envied the American economic attainments. Mao
did not. Their courses, irredeemably divergent, were set and
would soon become a matter of public record.
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VI THE XXI Ind PARTY CONGRESS
»
THE ROAD TO COMMUNISM - VIA MOSCOW
The XXIInd Party Congress was held from 17 to 31 October
1961. Nearly four times as many delegates were present (4800)
as were at either of the two previous Khrushchev congresses.
It was a grand affair, his biggest as well as his last Party
Congress. In brief, the XXIInd Congress did three things. It
marked an affirmation of and return to the actions and policies
of the XXth Congress, it served as the occasion for the presen-
tation of a twenty-year program for the Party (the first new
Party program since 1919). and it ratified the rift between the
USSR and China. The motto of the Congress was taken from the
new Party program: "The Road to Communism."
Before the Congress had even begun, however, there were
those Moscow had chosen to leave by the wayside. The Albanian
Party of Labour, although named in the list of fraternal parties
acknowledged at the opening of the first session, had not been
invited. Thus had the lines of dispute between the Soviet Union
and China hardened. The debate was now expanded to include a
wide range of issues affecting the two countries. The rhetoric
of the debate, however, was still couched mostly in ideological
terms. Each side was also openly seeking support from the other
socialist parties, even parties not in power.
The shadow of Josef Stalin, dead eight years, was a living
presence at the Congress It is not accidental that the two par-
ties most determinedly opposed to the Soviets, China and Albania,
were the ones most susceptible to the charges of one-man rule.
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When Chou En-lai walked out of the Congress, he conspicuously
and ostentatiously placed a wreath at Stalin's bust. Khrushchev,
on the other hand, took the ultimate action against Stalin which
was to have his body removed from the mausoleum and buried.
In a study of the significance and psychological conno-
tations of the specific words and phrases used by Soviet leaders,
Nathan Leites attaches particular importance to ideas and words
associated with death and burial. Russians, even Bolsheviks,
will not .readily talk about themselves or their friends being
buried or as corpses. That sort of talk is reserved for enemies. °5
The removal of Stalin's body from the Lenin mausoleum and its
burial was an act of more significance, it was a greater repud-
iation, than might at first have been appreciated in the West.
For the Kremlinologist , though, less reading between the lines
than usual was to be necessary at this Congress. The directions
and implications of Khrushchev's policies were openly stated in
the ochetnii doklad and the twenty-year Party program.
One of the more striking features of the doklad which Khrush-
chev delivered was the frequency of references made to programs,
policies, and decisions of the XXth Congress. By contrast, the
XXIst Congress was hardly even mentioned. That later Congress,
as it became clear, represented only a temporary pause in the
general course of events begun at the XXth Congress. Perhaps
this is what Khrushchev had in mind when he said near the be-
ginning of the doklad
, "History does not develop in a straight
"-"^Nathan Leites, Kremlin hoods (Santa monica, 1964), pp. 10-13.
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line, It has its zigzags and abrupt turns. "166 jn the inter-
national situation section, Khrushchev pronounced himself, on
the whole, pleased with how things had gone. "The Party pro-
pounded the important thesis JaX the XXth CongresJT7 that wars
between the states are not inevitable in the present epoch,
that they can be prevented. The evnts of the past six years
serve to confirm this too... those six years have been good
l67years on a world scale." ' There was a "growing fraternal
rapprochraent between the socialist countries" that only the
Yugoslavs, who had turned to revisionism, had thus far ignored.
The position of the US economy in world trade was, as always,
170
reported on the decline. ' And even though the United States
had not mended its imperialist ways but clung to the use of
"brutal force" as a foreign policy-1 ''-1- and was working for Ger-
man rearmament and encouraging German militarism 1 ' 2 Khrushchev
assured the delegates that the "struggle for general and com-
plete disarmament is /still7 a major component of Soviet for-
eign policy."!' 3 The first task for the Party in the area of
international relations was to ensure the "peaceful co-exis-
tence of states with different social systems." 1 '
What Khrushchev had called "good years on a world scale"
had seen, among other things, the withdrawal of all Soviet
technicians and advisors from China. After Hoxha sided with
I69
l66Documents of the XXiInd Party Congress, (New York, 1961)
p. 6.
I6?ibid, p. 12. 168 Ibid, p. 15. 169 lbid, p. 38.
1?0 Ibid, p. 25. 171 Ibid, p. 11. 1?2 Ibid, p. 26 ff.
1?3 Ibid, p. **9. 174lbld, p. 62.
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Peking, Soviet advisors were withdrawn from Albania. Only
the easing of tensions with the United States could give sense
to Khrushchev's statement. Surely Khrushchev could not have
foreseen or desired the consequences that the new policies of
the XXth Congress would have $ the upheavals in Poland and
Hungary, and the deterioration of relations with Peking. But
by this doklad he was giving assent to the course events had
taken. Thus he showed that he was more concerned about manip-
ulating his relationship with Washington than maintaining a
good relationship with Peking.
As might be expected, the section of the doklad on the
internal situation of the Soviet Union received the major em-
phasis and was related at many points to the twenty year Party
program. Whereas consumer goods had ranked last in the list
of production goals, at the XXth Party Congress (although they
were given their most prominent notice up to that point) now
they were discussed first. "The Party is paying particular
attention to greater output of foodstuffs, clothing, footwear -
of everything man needs - to raise the living standards of
the people, nl 75 it would be rash to say Khrushchev's trip to
the United States had convinced him that being a military
power was not inconsistent with massive production of consumer
goods, but it must have had its effect. In fact, a year and
a half later he would admit as much, but argue that US distri-
bution of its goods was inequitable . 1?6 The Soviet Union, he
1 75ibid, p. 66.
1 if\
Khrushchev, Rech ha Sobranii Izbirate l ei Kallninskogo
Izbiratelnogo Okruga Goroda Hosku i ( k o s c ow , 19 03) p. 25.
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maintained, did not really want all the Hydrogen bombs it was
building, "God save us from ever exploding these bombs over
anyone f s territory, no matter whose it may be. That is the
most desired dream of our life." 1 ??
The goal of the Soviet economic competition was , as it
had been ever since 1956, to surpass the United States. Not
only were figures produced to show a favorable rate of indus-
trial growth compared to the United States, but for the first
time absolute production statistics of the two countries were
compared. ' Outproducing the United States was "the basic
economic task of the Soviet Union" and its fulfillment would
be an "historical victory." '° There was only one sour note
in all this bri°"ht "^roirise Agriculture and ^n r,artic ii ~' ov>
Khrushchev's own "virgin lands" program had not gone well.
Khrushchev, departing from the text of the doklad
, addressed
American journalists in the hall and said that someday they
would regret making fun of the Soviet agricultural efforts.
The internal situation section ended on a positive note and
with a shaft aimed at Chinese economics. To raise living
standards and promote material requirements of the people was
the purpose of the mature socialist system in the USSR. 1 "!
(emphasis added)
The tone of the Party section of the doklad was a mixture
of school-masterishness and criticism, but not for the CPSU.
•*-77pocuments of the XXllnd Congress
, p. 69.
1?8 Ibid, p. 78. 179 Ibid, p. 79 l80Ibid, p. 110.
l8l Ibid, p. 113.
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Khrushchev began moderately enough; "Lenin teaches us to be
1 P"?
realistc in politics," he said by way of preamble. Then,
after discussion of the recent activities of the CP3U, came
the understatement of the Congress. The de-Stalinization
begun at the XXth Congress had given rise to "temporary dif-
ficulties for the CPSU and the fraternal Marxist-Leninist
parties.
"
l8 3 This was the prologue to a long denunciation of
the Albanian leadership, Hoxha et al. were using methods as
evil as Stalin's to rule their party. °^ Most grievous of
all was their failure to understand that "Creative Marxism-
Leninism does not tolerate stagnation of thought, the worship
of formulas that do not accord with the real state of affairs . " 1°5
For an example of "creative Marxism-Leninism" there was the new
CPSU party program.
The new program, entitled "The Road to Communism," was
the first new party program since 1919 • This program carried
the implicit assumption, elsewhere made quite explicit, that
the model for all socialist countries was the model of com-
munist construction of the Soviet Union. "any course steered
toward the construction of socialism in isolation, separately
from the world socialist community, runs counter to the objec-
tive laws of development of a socialist society." 1 "" This
program, however, did not read like a blueprint for building
the millenial communist society so much as a battle plan for
l82 Ibid, p. 131. l83ibid, p. 146. l8^Ibid, p. 152.
l8 5lbid, p. 182.




overtaking the United States of America. "To achieve the
world's highest productivity... in the final analysis, is the
most important, the principal thing for victory of the new
social system." 1^7 (emphasis added) "The Soviet Union will
surpass the economic level of the most developed capitalist
countries and move into first place for production per haed
of population, the world's highest living standard will be
ensured. "loo Khrushchev admitted that the Soviet Union was
still behind the United States in several areas of the econo-
my besides production, e.g. real income and consumption, but
this was because "unlike the United States we have had to pay
for the war." ° Sixteen years later the devastation of World
War II was still fresh in Soviet memory. To win the struggle
for economic supremacy, it would be necessary to "critically
adopt all technically and organizationally valuable points
available in the West," and one of the more important of these
was "getting greater returns from capital investments . "190
One wonders if Khrushchev had been thinking of a stock market.
What did all this have to do with the fraternal socialist
countries? What was the Soviet Union's economic success to
bring to them? Very little it appeared, for the goal of over-
taking the United States did not allow for much aid to frater-
nal socialist countries. "Peaceful economic competition is
the chief arena of the contest between the socialist and cap-
italist systems. The outcome of this competition will be de-




termined in tremendous degree by the competition between the
Soviet Union and the United States of America. ,sl 91 Such a
competition would leave only the most inferior of roles in it
for China. Was this slighting of China's requirements a de-
liberate attempt to repress China? Probably not. The new
Party program was a consistent and foreseeable progression
from the new policies announced at the XXth Party Congress.
It was a cause rather than an effect of the Sino-Soviet split.
There is an interesting sentence near the beginning of
the program's text, "The triumph of the socialist revoluitions
in China and a number of other European and Asian countries
has been the biggest development in world history since Octo-
ber 1917« — 1^3 pages of the program for building a
communist society in the world, this is the only mention of
China! Even Cuba received more attention. The Chinese were
much more interested in another sentence near the middle of
the text. "The draft program of the Party raises, and resolves,
a new important question of communist theory and practice -
the development of the dictatorship of the working class into
a state of the whole people . "^-93 The Chinese could and did
point to this as the ultimate indication of heresy by the
Soviets: abandonment of the class struggle.
Khrushchev's own concluding remarks to the Congress pro-
vide the best evidence of how he perceived the state of the
Soviet Union. He exulted that, because of the Soviet space
achievements, there was now at last an area in which the United
1 9 1 ibid, p. 129 1 9 2 Ibid, p. 18. Wlbid, p. 104.
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States must overtake the Soviets ,19^ in dealing with the
problems of fraternal party relations, specifically Albanian
sectarians and dogmatists, he came close to publicly reveal-
ing the true principals of the split when he noted that "there
is hardly onyone who can contribute to the solution of the
problem more than the Communist Party of China." 95 As for
the new Party program, one sentence said it very well: "The
struggle between the two ideologies ...has shifted from the
sphere of pure ideology to that of material production."
Chou En-lai might have had something to say about the purity
of Soviet ideology in the first place and about helping to
resolve Soviet differences with Albania, but he had already
walked out of the Congress.
Chinese and Soviet societies had drawn far apart as aptly
characterized by T. H. Rigby*s phrase "the embourgeoisement
of the Soviet Union and the proletarianization of China. "*'6
There were the radically different approaches to solving domes-
tic problems. For, example in agriculture there was the com-
munization in China as opposed to the abolition of the central
machine-tractor stations in the Soviet Union. These domestic
divergences alone might have been expected to lead to argu-
ments and debate over the correct course, but it was proper
relations with the West and specifically with the United States
that sparked the debate which followed immediately in the after-
19^Documents of the XXIInd Congress
, p. 203. 1 95ibid, p. 215.
19 The Embourgeoisement of the Soviet Union and the Pro-
leterianization of China," in Kurt London's Unity and Contra-
diction, i\ew York, 1962.
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math of the XXIInd Congress. The war by proxy became public.
After the Congress when the Chinese denounced Tito, they
now meant Khrushchev, Khrushchev thundered against Albania
when he meant China. A typical Soviet example: "Rejection
of the principle of peaceful co-existence is typical of the
most reactionary and adventurist wing of the bourgeois ide-
ology and politics. It is even more typical that certain
views held by modern dogmatists, who have also taken the line
of negating Lenin's principle of peaceful co-existence, are
contiguous with the extremely reactionary conception.
"
1 97
These dogmatists were the leaders of Albania who were also
guilty of "extreme adventurism. ul ° The facade of the proxy
war was first broken by the Albanians when the Albanian news-
paper Zeri 1 Populit , naming names, directly accused Tito of
being the intermediary between Khrushchev and the American
imperialists . 99
The Cuban missile crisis in October, 1962 then gave the
Chinese the opportunity to return to the charge of adventurism,
compounded by capitulationism, against the Soviets. The Cuban
episode seems markedly at variance with the general trend of So-
viet policy toward the United States as followed from I956 on.
The apparent inconsistency is resolved if one accepts the
thesis advanced by Adam Ulam that the Soviets did not intend
to strike at the United States with the missiles but rather
1 9?A. Sovetov, "Who Stands to Gain from the Splitting
Activities of the Albanian Leaders?" IA, January 1962, p. 18.
1 9 8lbid, p. 19. 1 99pioyd, p. 324.
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use their inevitably required removal as a "bargaining chip
for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons in Europe. 2 ^ This
thesis is both highly plausible and accords well with pre-
vious Soviet policy towards the United States. If success-
fully carried out, such a gambit would have confirmed the
Soviet's oft-made assertion that they, and they alone, knew
how to deal with the arch imperialist rival.
As it turned out, the Cuban missile crisis, as an unfore-
seen by-product added a new item to the Sino-Soviet dispute,
the border question. Briefly summarizing Dennis Doolin's ex-
201planation of events, this is what happened. When the Chi-
nese accused the Soviets of capitulating to the imperialists,
Khrushchev retorted that the Chinese themselves allowed the
imperialists to maintain "outhouses" in Macao and Hong Kong.
The Chinese rebuttal to this was to call to question all ille-
gal Imperialist seizures and occupation of Chinese territory.
Of course the largest area that the Chinese alleged to have
been illegally taken by imperialist expansion was occupied by
the Soviet Union north and east of the Ussuri and Amur Rivers.
Khrushchev's remark at the XXI st Congress implying that a mu-
tual border provided grounds for clashes (and the absence of
a US-USSR mutual border should have meant better relations)
was now to be fully borne in on him.
The Soviets themselves began to identify their opponent
200Ulam, pp. 299-3^0.
201Dennis Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet




in the dispute openly when on 7 January 1963 an unsigned ed-
itorial in Pravda identified the Chinese as the object of its
ideological attacks. 02 All barriers were down. In February
the Chinese published an editorial which was their first full
account of the dispute. ^ The XXth CPSU Congress was identi-
fied as the starting point of the dispute with "its negative
aspects, namely, the wrong viewpoints it put forward on cer-
tain important questions of principle relating to the inter-
national Communist movement." The most important of these
wrong viewpoints was on the correct handling of the "united
struggle against the common enemy, and above all, US imperi-
alism."
The Central Committee of the CPSU itself took up the de-
bate. In a letter to the Central Committee of the CPC, the
CCCPSU agreed that "the rapacious nature of imperialism has
not changed" but in view of the "radical qualitative change
in the military-technical means of waging war resulting from
thermanuclear weapons possessing unprecedented force," it was
now evident that for all communists the "first emphasis"
should be on "strengthening the great socialist community and
its economic might" and'raising the standard of living of its
peoples. "20^- The letter carried a dire warning that "those
who prize the interests of socialism and peace must do every-
202Floyd, p. 3^6.
203^
"Whence the Differences Between Comrade Thorez and US,"
in Floyd, pp. 375ff.
cu
^"Letter of the CCCPSU to the CCCPC" (30 March 1963) in
Berton, Vol.1, p. 3/3O, k.
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thing to frustrate the criminal designs of world reaction and
to prevent it from unleashing a thermo-nuclear war dragging
hundreds of millions of people down into the grave with it." 20 -5
The Chinese reply to this letter came in June and showed
that they were unmoved by the Soviet arguments. The fundamental
line of the international Communist movement, the reply asserted,
"is the struggle against U.S. imperialism" and peaceful coexist-
ence departs from "the revolutionary teachings of Marxism-Len-
inism" The Chinese warned that "to entrust the fate of the
people and of mankind to collaboration with U.S imperialism is
207
to lead people astray." ' Finally, asked the Chinese, "can
peaceful transition be made into a new world-wide strategic
principle for the international communist movement? Absolutely
not.- 208
The signing of a partial nuclear test ban treaty by the
United States and the Soviet Union in the Summer of 1963 was,
to Peking, the last straw. The treaty itself was denounced as
a "dirty fraud" and had been arrived at only by means of "un-
principled concessions to imperialialism. " Because of this
"open capitulation" to the capitalists, the Chinese predicted
for the Soviet leaders that "their ultimate collapse is in
store." 7 The attack, reprinted in the Soviet press, then
expanded to include a general analysis of recent policies of
205Ibid, p. 3/30,5.
"AProposal Concerning the General Line of the Inter-
national Communist Movement" ( 14 June 1963), Berton, Vol. I,
p. 6/14,3.
207 Ibid, p. 6/14,7. 208Ibid, p. 6/14,11.
2 09CUSP
, Vol XV No. 34, pp. 3-4.
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Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders. Their real goal consisted
in "becoming absolute in the socialist camp," 2^ To that end
"the Soviet leaders long before today began to enter deals
with American imperialism, trying to bind China hand and foot." 211
The Soviet response began by accusing the Chinese of "as-
suming the role of the right flank in the ranks of the Ameri-
can •madnien'." 212 The remainder of the rebuttal, in effect,
confirmed the Chinese charges about Soviet absolutist aspira-
tions and deals with Americans. The Soviets held that it was
sufficient for the defense of the socialist camp that the So-
213
viets alone have nuclear weapons. ^ Concerning nuclear trea-
ties with the Americans, the Soviets as the only socialist
possessors of nuclear weapons could say haughtily, "we know
oik
what we're talking about." The final jab at Peking was
that the Chinese should learn from the example of the United
States and the USSR how to exercise restraint in international
relations. -*
Each side accused the other of maintaining the split for
its own advantage. When the Soviets protested that they had
made new attempts after the XXIInd Congress to resolve differ-
ences, the Chinese scornfully replied "the 'new attempts* made
after the 22nd Congress of the CPSU were aimed, not at improv-
ing Sino-Soviet relations and strengthening unity between fra-
ternal Parties and countries, but on the contrary, at further
ganging up with the U.S. Imperialists... in order to create
210Ibid, p. 6. 211 Ibid, p. 7. 212 Ibid, p. 8.
213Ibid, p. 9. 2l4Ibid, p. 10. 21 5ibid, p. 13.
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a wider split in the socialist camp and the international
Communist movement."^ 1 "
A wider split had indeed been created. Philip Mosely,
writing in October 1963, surveyed the state of Sino-Soviet
relations and concluded that "the resentment of each other's
domestic policies has played a major part in the process of
mutual estrangement" 21 ? but "the basic and central dispute
between Moscow and Peking revolves around their differing
appraisals of the present balance of strategic power in the
world." 218
Nikita Khrushchev was removed from office less than a
year later, in no small part because of his handling of the
Chinese situation. Perhaps in celebration, the Chinese set
off their first nuclear device the next day. But soon Peking
attacked the new Soviet leadership's policies as "Khrushchev-
ism without Khrushchev." In March of I969 there were armed
clashes of Chinese and Soviet border troops along the Ussuri.
River. Even the fact that each supported North Vietnam against
the South Vietnamese and the United States has proved insuffi-
cient to restore any vestige of their former relationship.
The best evidence of the existence of a fundamental split is
that the two socialist states still conduct their affairs at
governmental rather than Party levels.
2l6n The origin of the Differences," Berton, Vol.11, p. 9/6, 2?.
21 ?"The Chinese-Soviet Rift: Origins and Portents," Foreign




VII A NEW COLD WAR
The Sino-Soviet split has become one of the more uncom-
forable realities of present-day international affairs. Both
traditional Western thought based on Aristotelian logic,, and
Marxism in all its variants based on the dialectic tend to
view the world in dualistic, not to say Manichean, terms.
The fact that the bi-polar world that emerged in the after-
math of World War II has become at least a tri-polar world,
and more probably a polycentric one, is a fact that has proved
quite difficult for all three nations - the United States,
China, and the USSR - to grasp.
The Chinese in the early 1950' s had just recently com-
pleted their long march to a successful revolution, and it was
possible to observe in their statements and actions a revolu-
tionary fervor, an elan vital , which had been diminished in
the Soviet Union by the passage of time, the enormous sacri-
fices of World War II, and inescapable collisions with reality.
The Chinese, from their viewpoint, could convince themselves
that they had thrown back the Americans in Korea and were now
ready for more successes. Averill Harriman characterizing the
differences noted that "the Kremlin leaders have become much
more cautious. They do not want everything they have built
to be devastated by a nuclear war. Communist China, however,
219has a great deal less to lose. 7
The viewpoint in the early 1950* s from the Soviet position
2l 9w. Averill Harriman in Red China and the U.S.S.R.
(Washington, 1963), p. 11.
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was less sanguine. At the time of Stalin's death7 Soviet for-
eign policy was not enjoying any significant success. The
Korean War had proved a failure. NATO was the symbol of a
hardened Western policy, and containment, for the moment, was
effective. It was obvious to Stalin's successors, as it may
have been to Stalin just before his death, that new policies
were needed to demobilize and outmaneuver the West. In the
USSR, the Soviet people were growing restive. There was evi-
dence, the "Doctor's Plot," that new purges were being pre-
pared. Malenkov, temporary victor in the struggle for leader-
ship and seeking a new direction, advocated an emphasis on
light industry and spoke of the end of civilization that might
ensue from a nuclear war. It is a pithy commentary on Soviet
politics in general and Khrushchev in particular that he was
able to wrest control of the party from Malenkov by denouncing
these positions and then assume them once he had come to of-
fice. It was the kind of maneuvering worthy of Lenin.
It is doubtful that Khrushchev foresaw the effect that
his policies promulgated at the XXth Party Congress would have
on the rest of the socialist camp. They were conceived in
terms of and directed toward the relationship of the Soviet
Union and the United States. Khrushchev wanted to be an equal
of any American president with whom he might meet. To do this
he would have to reduce the advantage which the United States
held in its advanced deployment of forces at overseas bases.
Equality also meant of course that he alone would speak for
the socialist camp as he held the United States did for the
capitalist camp. He wanted the Soviet Union to be a true
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workers' paradise and outshine the United States in economic
level, production, and standard of living. To accomplish this
he had to divert priorities from strictly military expendi-
tures. To accomplish both his foreign and domestic goals he
had to eliminate the shadow and legacy of Stalin and the the-
sis of inevitability of a final all-out war between capitalist
and socialist camps. All this required the sort of absolute
and unquestioned leadership in the socialist camp that the
Soviet Union enjoyed under Stalin. But Stalin's ways had
in large part been disavowed and Khrushchev was to prove nei-
ther statesman, nor theoretician, nor agricultural and industial
expert enough to make his scheme work.
When Khrushchev began to give expression to his new and
less exhausting policy of dealing with the West, peaceful co-
existence, the Chinese were skeptical and were in no way reas-
sured by the de-thronement of Stalin. Increasingly, the Chinese
became convinced that the Soviets meant to abandon the cause
of world revolution and also their commitments to aid in devel-
opment of China. But the logic of Marxian dialectic, abetted
by a deep-seated xenophobia, forced the Chinese inevitably to
the conclusion that since the Soviets were no longer following
a correct path for international communism, the objective con-
sequence:, of Moscow's action was to put it in collusion with
Washington. Hence the veiled criticisms of Soviet policies
evolved into open charges of collaboration or ganging up with
the United States. This simply was not true.
For all his talk of peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev

9?
never said that he was opposed to a struggle between the two
camps - a struggle which would end in complete political vic-
tory for the Soviet Union. Nor did he oppose war, per se, for
he repeatedly endorsed - and supported - so-called wars of
national liberation. What Khrushchev did wish to avoid was
a specific kind of war, a thermo-nuclear war, because he could
not be sure of the outcome. The West then had superiority in
the means of such warfare. During the latter part of the
1950* s the Soviets even conducted a "hate America" campaign
220
while simultaneously preaching peaceful coexistence. The
Chinese did not see the same restraints on Soviet options that
the Soviets themselves saw. When the Sputniks were launched
the Soviet failure to translate such obvious technological
advantage into immediate power politics actions convinced the
Chinese that the Soviets had betrayed the revolution. Peaceful
coexistence was only excusable as a tactical expedient for a
weak nation, not a strong one.
In the West, on the other hand, there was an understand-
able hesitation on the part of most observers to see the new
Soviet policies or the resulting strains in Sino-Soviet rela-
tions as portending anything like the split that occured. It
would have been too much like wishful thinking. The Soviet's
inability to foresee what was happening until the split was
almost inevitable is equally understandable. The Soviets had
not been used to giving much attention to Chinese perceptions
and desires. Chou En-lai once chided Soviet officials that
^^Denny. p C it.
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most high CPC officials knew at least some Russian but that
none of the high CPSU officials knew any Chinese at all. The
majority of official statements of the Soviets for a period
from 1956 to 1963 show readily that the United States, and
even a re-armed West Germany, were much more of the Soviets*
minds than was China. A full content analysis of the doklads
of the XXth, XXIst, and XXI I rid Congresses would show something
on the order of fifteen to twenty references to the United
States for every one to China.
The split was not planned, it was the unforeseen develop-
ment of Soviet policies which were calculated for their effect
on the position of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the United States
and not for how they would be received by Peking or how much
these policies seemed taken directly from the pages of Lenin's
works
.
Inevitably, examination of the split must deal with the
question of whether or not the fundamental cause was an ideo-
logical dispute. Evidence to support the contention that the
essential points of disagreement were ideological comes from
the early arguments in the debates which were denunciations
of opportunism, dogmatism, revisionism, and so on ad infinitum
.
The fact of the matter is that any dispute between the two
powers for any reason would have been cast in ideological
terms for both professed an official ideology that explained
everything. Of course ideological exegesis had a way of be-
ing developed after the fact. To say that the dispute was
ideological, then, is to comment on the language rather than
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the substance of the issues.
Since the dispute became an open split in 1963 » a number
of other issues have entered into contention. Racial character-
izations were frequently employed in the middle and late 1960's.
The border questions raised after the Cuban missile crisis e-
rupted into actual fighting in 1969. Even cultural policies
have been the target of reciprocal condemnations. The Vietnam
war, which might have been expected to provide a special oppor-
tunity to draw the disputants together, saw as much contention
as cooperation in matters of aiding and advising Hanoi. All
these factors, however, appeared later in the dispute and are
derivative of the initial questions although each new factor
added serves to keep a possible reconciliation further off.
One other factor in the dispute which may be of equal
weight with the question of how to respond to the challenges
of US military power and US economic accomplishemnts also
dates back to the events at the XXth Party Congress. This
factor is the question of authority in the Communist world.
The Chinese objected to the de-thronement of Stalin, moreover
,
001
they objected to its being done unilaterally by the Soviets.
If arbitrary one-man rule from Moscow was to be repudiated for
the nevj direction of international communism, should such a
decision have been made arbitrarily by one man in the Kremlin,
they later asked. Publicly, the Chinese went along at the
time with Khrushchev's policies with respect to new ideas of
leadership, but privately the Chinese cannot but have had ser-
221
"One the Question of Stalin," in Berton, Vol.2, p. 9/20, 2.
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ious reservations. The same "basis for criticizing Stalin
would also permit criticism of Mao's cult of personality.
It was for reasons dictated by the struggle for supremacy
in Kremlin leadership that Khrushchev made the Secret Speech
when he did. And his decision to do so, to steal a march on
pop
his political opponents, was made during the Congress itself. c-
But even if these considerations had not prevailed, Khrushchev
would still have had to effect some sort of repudiation of
Stalin, however indirect, if he wished to follow through with
the new foreign and domestic policies he had initiated before
the Congress. Even this factor in the split, the leadership
question, bears some relation to the question of those policies
of Khrushchev which were based on his view of the United States s
The Sino-Soviet split is a complex phenomenon and no sin-
gle-factor explanation can reasonably be offered as its cause.
Nor was the dispute in any sense inevitable. Certainly Mao
would have been dissatisfied to remain subordinate to a leader
he must have regarded as his inferior; a new relationship of
some sort was inevitable. But the decision to go separate
ways could not have been made lightly in Peking. The Chinese
leadership must have felt that they had no choice but to aban-
don what had looked like a nearly invincible alliance. In
fact, the decision was made only after the Chinese perceived
that Khrushchev would persist in his un-Marxist and fatal
fascination with American nuclear power and the American pro-
For a concise summary of the internal political maneu-
vering in the Praesidium of the CCCPSU before the XXth Congress
and which led to Khrushchev's making the Secret Speech see Con-




duction of consumer and agricultural goods.
As this study has shown, the Soviet references to the
necessity of avoiding nuclear confrontation with the United
States and of producing a workers* paradise to surpass cap-
ital achievements hardly ever abated once they had begun in
1956. Even such incidents as the Mid-East crisis of 1958 and
the U-2 incident had only temporary and slight effects on the
course of these Soviet policies. The Chinese confined the
initial public expression of their misgivings to oblique cri-
ticisms of certain right-wing ideological deviations. As
Soviet strength relative to the West appeared to grow - the
East wind prevailing over the West wind - but Soviet assertions
did not, the Chinese became more explicit about what was most
bothersome to them. The Soviets were exhorted to assume vigor-
ous leadership by the challenge of "Long Live Leninism," and
when that failed, less than three years later, the Chinese
journals were openly accusing the Soviets of collaboration
with the United States.
China has had a history of having its future decided by
powers who did so without reference to Chinese interests. The
CPC leadership's deepest fear was that even their closest ally
and socialist partner would again do so with their most power-
ful enemy. Moscow, on the other hand, simply did not take
into account as previously it had never really needed to, how
its policies would be received in Peking. Robert North summed
up the situation very aptly: "It was not inevitable that dis-
putes over how to deal with the United States would cause a
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Sino-Soviet split. What was inevitable was that when such a
split did occur this dispute would figure most prominently . "223
What has resulted from this schism in the orthodoxy of
the international communist movement is a world in which bi-
polar ity is now and perhaps forever gone as the international
order, and a new balance of power has emerged. It is no acci-
dent that the present American Secretary of State is most
thoroughly grounded in the modes of diplomacy of the nineteenth
century Europe of Metternich and Bismarck. It may be that in
this new world order the original causes of the Sino-Soviet
split have no more than academic interest in view of the con-
tinued addition of more divisive factors. The question that
is worthy of consideration concerns the effect on Sino-Soviet
unity if both should perceive the United States to be no longer
strong enough or willing to pose a credible deterrent to ini-
tiation of nuclear war.
The United States did not consciously contribute to ini-
tiation of the Sino-Soviet split except as it presented a reso-
lute and visible resistance to the machinations of international
communism's progressive acquisition of yet more states. The
Soviets recognized the determination and appreciated the power
whereas the Chinese did not. If that resolution should fail
or that strength should appreciably decline then the original
reason for the split will have passed. The major obstacle
will have been removed for the Chinese and Soviets once again
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23 - 30 July 1958
31 July - 3 Aug. 1958
29 August 1958
September 1958
2? Jan. - 5 Feb. 1959
Aug. - Sep. 1959
15 - 28 Sep. 1959
30 Sep. 1959
16 June i960
Soviet Union recognizes Chinese Peo-
ples Republic.
USSR and CFR sign "Treaty of Friend-
ship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistence"
but only after two months of discusions.
Stalin dead.
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia resume
diplomatic relations.
Khrushchev visits Peking. Agrees to
return Port Arthur, give loan of 52
mil. rubles, return East Siberian RR
to Chinese control, and end joint stock
companies.
Malenkov resigns.
XXth Party Congress of CPSU.
Cominform dissolved.
China recognizes Yugoslavia.
Polish riots, Hungarian revolt.
Moscow Declaration. Peking line incor-
porated denouncing Imperialism.
Mid-East Crisis.
Khrushchev's second visit to Peking.
Chinese begin communes.
Taiwan Straits crisis.




Khrushchev visits United States.
Khrushchev visits Peking for third
time. Very cool reception.
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5 - Ik December i960
22 - 28 October 1962
January 1963
25 July 1963
3rd Congress of Rumanian CP in Bucarest.
Soviet technicians leave China.
Summit at Vienna, Kennedy and Khrushchev.
XXI Ind Party Congress of CPSU begins.
Chou En-lai walks put of congress and
leaves Moscow.
Congress ends.
Stalin* s remains removed from Lenin's
mausoleum.
Conference of 81 Parties in Moscow.
Soviet line promulgated over Chinese
objection.
Soviets and Albanians recall embassy
staffs.
Cuban missile crisis.
Soviets and Chinese begin open, ex-
plicit denunciations of each other.
Partial nuclear test-ban treaty signed
by United States and USSR. China
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